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A detailed and rigorous analysis of Gödel’s proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this 
analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what Gödel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon which to 
base future research. The second is to construct a coherent explication of Gödel’s proof that is not only approachable by the 
non-specialist, but also brings to light the core principles underlying Gödel’s proof. 
Key Words and Phrases: Rosser, Tarski, formal systems, metamathematics, ω-inconsistency, simple consistency, 
arithmetization of syntax, proof theory, model theory 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With Gödel’s famous incompleteness proof he attempted to prove some kind of limit on what can 
be proven within any sufficiently robust and purely formal mathematical system. Subsequently, in 
the many decades since Gödel published his proof myriad interpretations and theories as well as 
philosophical extensions of Gödel’s proof have been devised. However, we assert that much of 
this has simply served to confuse and obscure what Gödel actually proved because what a proof 
actually proves and what a proof is interpreted to prove can be very different and even potentially 
incommensurate things. 
 
Therefore, the intention of this proof will be to reveal the foundation of Gödel’s incompleteness 
proof within the context of a modern understanding of the fundamental issues that underlie the 
concept of incompleteness in order to provide a coherent basis for understanding and extending 
Gödel’s ideas. Furthermore, it is hoped that by clearly illustrating the core principles of Gödel’s 
proof that his proof will also become more accessible to those outside the domain of specialists in 
mathematical logic. However, an introduction to mathematical logic will not be provided and thus 
a minimal understanding of mathematical logic will be assumed along with at least a rudimentary 
familiarity with proof theory, model theory, recursive function theory and metamathematics. 
 
The primary reference for Gödel’s incompleteness proof is [1.a]. The exposition of Gödel’s proof 
in [2.a] is essentially identical and thus may also be referred to. An exposition of Gödel’s proof is 
found in [3.a] as well, but this exposition is different from the previous two and contains typos and 
omissions that make it unsuitable for a detailed and rigorous analysis. 
 
Section 2: Background is an informal introduction to the basic ideas that form the foundation of 
Gödel’s proof as well as the motivation for the proof. This section is intended to provide a simple 
intuitive introduction to the concepts and theories along with the formal structures that are the 
foundation of Gödel’s proof. Readers with more than a rudimentary familiarity with Gödel’s proof 
may begin reading at section 2.5: The Fundamental Concepts of Proof and Truth. 
 
In section 3: Notation and Terminology the standard notation from mathematical logic will be 
formally defined along with some additional notation that is specific to Gödel’s proof. In addition, 
some elementary terminology concerning sets and functions will also be introduced. 
 
Section 4: Gödel’s Proof contains the formal proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem along 
with a brief description of the proof. Everything that is required to understand the formalization of 
the proof of Gödel’s theorem in this section will have been defined and sufficiently explained in 
the previous two sections with the exception of Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency. 
 
Section 5: The Concepts of ω-inconsistency and Mathematical Induction contains the formal 
definition of Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency. The customary interpretation of ω-inconsistency 
will also be investigated, which requires an examination of the relationship between the concept of 
ω-inconsistency and the principle of mathematical induction. 
 
In section 6: The Intuitionistic Acceptability of Gödel’s Proof the idea of what may be considered 
to be a constructive proof will be investigated in an attempt to evaluate Gödel’s statement that the 
proof of his first incompleteness theorem is constructive and thus also intuitionistically acceptable. 
 
Section 7: A Meticulous Intuitive Analysis of Gödel’s Proof is a detailed semi-formal examination 
of the proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. 
 
Section 8: Rosser’s Proof contains Kleene’s formal proof of Rosser’s incompleteness proof from 
[4] along with a brief description of the proof. Rosser only required the assumption that the system 
in his proof is simply consistent and thus the customary interpretation of Rosser’s proof is that 
Rosser is able dispense with Gödel’s assumption that the formal system is also ω-consistent. 
 
In section 9: The Difference between Gödel’s Proof and Rosser’s Proof the differences between 
Gödel’s incompleteness proof and Rosser’s incompleteness proof are investigated, which includes 
a proof of Gödel’s theorem that only requires the assumption that the system is simply consistent. 
 
Section 10: Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson’s Proof contains the incompleteness proof that is 
found in Undecidable Theories by Tarski in collaboration with Mostowski and Robinson [5]. 
 
Finally, in section 11: Summary the concepts of incompleteness and ω-inconsistency are examined 
in more detail, which includes formal interpretations of ω-inconsistency from Tarski [6.a] and 
Quine [7.a] along with a simple metamathematical proof that reveals the basic underlying structure 
of the incompleteness proofs as well as the role of ω-inconsistency in Gödel’s proof. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The background or context within which Gödel published his proof is essential to understanding 
what Gödel intended to prove and thus also what he actually did prove. Therefore, a brief intuitive 
description of the underlying question that Gödel attempted to answer with his proof will be 
provided along with an entirely informal introduction to the fundamental concepts and structures 
that serve as the foundation of the formal system that Gödel constructed within his proof. 
2.1 Formal Axiomatic Systems 
A formal system is, in essence, a system that has been explicitly and completely defined. At its 
most basic level a formal system consists of a clearly defined language. The language is comprised 
of a collection of symbols that represent the most primitive elements of the language and are used 
to construct the formulas of the system along with a list of rules that define what constitutes a 
syntactically well-formed or semantically meaningful formula. Subsequently, the description of 
the formal system is different depending on whether the formal system is constructed from a 
proof-theoretic or a model-theoretic perspective. 
 
In the most simplistic terms, a proof-theoretic system consists of a list of rules of inference that are 
used to construct the deductive proofs of the formulas in the system whereas a model-theoretic 
system consists of a model, which is a collection of objects that the formulas of the system make 
statements about. Hence, a proof-theoretic system may be characterized as only being concerned 
with syntax or the actual formulas themselves whereas a model-theoretic system may be 
characterized as being concerned with semantics or the actual things that the formulas refer to. 
 
An axiomatic system is a system that takes one or more formulas to be the axioms of the system, 
which may potentially be an infinite number of formulas if an axiom schema is employed. The 
axioms of the system are a collection of formulas that are asserted to be universally true and from 
which all the other true formulas or theorems of the system are inferred. In a proof-theoretic 
system the theorems of the system are deductively proven from the axioms of the system or from 
previously proven theorems. In a model-theoretic system the axioms of the system define the valid 
relationships that exist between the objects that constitute the model of the system and thus the 
theorems of the system are proven based on what is true of the objects within the model. 
 
A proof-theoretic system and a model-theoretic system are not actually two different systems, but 
are rather two different aspects of any formal axiomatic system. The most significant difference 
between the two types of systems is how the theorems of the system are proven. A proof-theoretic 
system is based solely on deductive truth or deriving theorems from the axioms of the system, 
regardless of what the formulas of the system actually refer to, whereas a model-theoretic system 
explicitly considers what the formulas of the system refer to and are true of. 
 
Furthermore, a model-theoretic system is typically also a set-theoretic system because the axioms 
of Set Theory are considered to define what could be called the universal model. Since Set Theory 
is considered to express the most primitive concept of number then, in the same way that the 
concept of number is often considered to be the basis of everything, Set Theory is considered to be 
the basis of every system. This is why Set Theory is sometimes referred to as the theory of 
everything. The de facto standard formalization of Set Theory is Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory 
with the Axiom of Choice or ZFC Set Theory. Therefore, when the specific axioms of Set Theory 
are directly referenced in what follows, the axioms of ZFC Set Theory are implied. 
 
The formal system that Gödel constructs in his proof is inherently a proof-theoretic system. Gödel 
does not explicitly describe his system as a proof-theoretic system as opposed to a model-theoretic 
system because the process of differentiating these two types of systems was still in its infancy at 
the time Gödel published his proof. Thus, this is not a strict designation although it is unequivocal 
because the defining characteristic of Gödel’s system is the concept of a proof-theoretic deductive 
proof within a formal axiomatic system. 
 
It is of interest to note that a complete system is often defined in modern texts as a system within 
which a proof-theoretic deductive proof is equivalent to a model-theoretic proof. Therefore, within 
this context, if a formal system is complete then the existence of a proof in either system implies 
the existence of a proof in the other. 
2.2 Consistency, Completeness and Hilbert’s Program 
The underlying question that Gödel’s proof was intended to answer is related to what has become 
known as Hilbert’s program. The primary objective of Hilbert’s program was to construct a simply 
consistent and complete formal axiomatic system that could be proven to be simply consistent and 
complete using only finitary methods of proof and within which all the essential theorems of 
mathematics could be proven. Subsequently, since Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are generally 
interpreted to have proven that any sufficiently robust and simply consistent formal axiomatic 
system must also be incomplete, Gödel’s proof is also generally interpreted to have proven that 
Hilbert’s program cannot succeed. 
 
More intuitively, the objective of Hilbert’s program was to construct a formal axiomatic system 
that is unquestionably valid and also capable of a proving whether any meaningful sentence in the 
language of the system is true. Since a formal axiomatic system is defined to be simply consistent 
if a contradiction cannot be inferred from its axioms then the formal requirement that the system 
be simply consistent requires the system be incapable of proving any sentence to be both true and 
false, which is a contradiction. The formal requirement that the system be complete requires the 
system to be capable of proving every meaningful sentence to be either true or false. Since a 
sentence that is true may be interpreted to be the refutation of the negation of that sentence then a 
formal axiomatic system may be alternately defined to be complete if every meaningful sentence 
that is true can be inferred from its axioms. As a result, the requirement that the formal system be 
proven to be simply consistent and complete using only finitary methods of proof serves to 
establish the unquestionable validity and universal applicability of the system. This requirement is 
informal because a finitary method of proof has never been precisely defined. 
 
What Hilbert called a finitary method of proof may be characterized as method of proof that is 
inherently finite and thus does not depend on any questionable assumptions about infinity or 
assumptions about what is true of a potentially or actually infinite number of objects. Since some 
of the formulas being considered may apply to an infinite number of objects, it is the actual 
method that is characterized as finite. Therefore, within the context of Hilbert’s program, a finitary 
method of proof suggests a method of proof that employs only finitary reasoning that can be easily 
and clearly justified. As a result, Hilbert’s emphasis on finitary methods of proof may be 
characterized as an emphasis on methods of proof that are not controversial and thus are also 
unquestionably and universally acceptable. 
 
It is of interest to note that in Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem Gödel formally defined a 
simply consistent formal axiomatic system as a system within which at least one sentence cannot 
be proven to be true regardless of whether the sentence is actually true. This definition of simple 
consistency is based on ex falso quodlibet or the principle of explosion, which asserts that every 
sentence can be inferred from the axioms of a simply inconsistent system. 
 
The pertinent details of Hilbert’s program can be found in van Heijenoort [2], particularly [2.b]. 
2.3 Effective Computability 
The concept of effective computability is an important aspect of Gödel’s proof. The general 
characterization of an effectively computable function that Gödel defined in his proof is not only a 
crucial part of his proof, but it also became the basis of the modern theory of recursive functions. 
The recursive functions are one of three models of computation that were subsequently proven to 
be equivalent and, according to Church’s Thesis, serve to define what can be effectively computed 
by any model of computation. 
 
The recursive functions consist of the primitive recursive functions and the general recursive 
functions. Gödel defined the primitive recursive functions in his proof, although he referred to 
them simply as recursive because the modern terminology had not yet been established. The 
difference between the two classes of recursive functions is that, due to how the primitive 
recursive functions are defined, their computation is bounded whereas the general recursive 
functions may employ an unbounded search. As a result, the computation of a primitive recursive 
function is always finite or will always eventually terminate in a finite number of steps. However, 
the computation of a general recursive function may potentially never terminate. Hence, since a 
computation that never terminates is effectively synonymous with a computation that does not 
compute a value, a general recursive function will not necessarily always compute a value whereas 
a primitive recursive function will always compute a value. 
 
Gödel defined a list of relations in his proof that precisely define the basic operations that he 
employed in his proof (Appendix B: Gödel’s System). Subsequently, in a parenthetical note after 
the definition of the last relation, relation 46, Gödel asserts that every relation that he defined can 
be proven to be [primitive] recursive with the single exception of relation 46, which thus asserts 
that a primitive recursive function can be defined to implement or compute every relation except 
relation 46. The reason relation 46 cannot be asserted to be primitive recursive is because the 
definition of relation 46 employs an unbounded search whereas every search within the definition 
of all of the other relations is explicitly bounded. 
 
Therefore, since the relations that Gödel employed to prove his incompleteness theorems are 
primitive recursive and thus the relations represent inherently finite computations, the role of the 
concept of effective computability within Gödel’s proof may be characterized as fulfilling the 
requirement of Hilbert’s program that the methods of proof be finitary. As a consequence, the 
concept of effective computability serves to substantiate the validity of Gödel’s proof because the 
methods that Gödel employed in his proof do not involve any subjective processes or steps that 
cannot be completely and objectively analyzed and validated. Although relation 46 is not primitive 
recursive and thus the relation does not necessarily represent a computation that is inherently 
finite, it may still be possible to consider the relation to be finitary due to how its use is restricted 
within Gödel’s proof. This will be specifically addressed in more detail in what follows. 
2.4 Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax 
Gödel constructed what have come to be known as Gödel numbers. A Gödel number is the unique 
numeric representation of a unique sequence of symbols that represent a unique formula in the 
language of a formal system. The process employed to construct Gödel numbers is often referred 
to as the arithmetization of syntax because a unique sequence of symbols, which is the syntax of a 
formula, is transformed into a unique natural number that may be analyzed and manipulated by a 
mathematical system based on the concepts of arithmetic. Furthermore, Gödel also proved that 
every unique finite sequence of formulas in a formal system also corresponds to a unique natural 
number and thus a Gödel number is also the unique numeric representation of a unique finite 
sequence of formulas in a formal system. 
 
Each of the primitive symbols in the language of Gödel’s formal system is assigned the unique 
natural number 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and then every possible variable is assigned a prime number 
greater than 13 with an exponent greater than zero indicating its type. Hence, a sequence of n ≥ 1 
symbols is also a sequence of natural numbers. We will denote this sequence by m1, …, mn, where 
each mi is the natural number that was assigned to the ith symbol in the formula. As a result, the 
Gödel number of a formula is p1
m1
 × … × pn
mn
, where each pi denotes the ith prime number. This 
number is unique due to the prime decomposition theorem, which states that every unique natural 
number has a unique decomposition into its prime components. Subsequently, the Gödel number 
of a finite sequence of formulas is constructed similarly. A finite sequence of n ≥ 1 formulas is 
also a sequence of Gödel numbers. We will denote this sequence by G1, …, Gn, where each Gi is 
the Gödel number of the ith formula in the sequence. As a result, the Gödel number of a finite 
sequence of formulas is p1
G1
 × … × pn
Gn
. 
 
In the preceding construction the type of a variable is referred to. This is a reference to the simple 
theory of types, which Gödel employed in his proof. However, the simple theory of types is no 
longer used nor is it relevant to our examination of what Gödel proved. Therefore, any reference to 
the type of a variable is included for technical accuracy only and may be ignored. 
 
This construction of Gödel numbers is more intuitively expressive than technically efficient or 
practical. Gödel employed prime numbers to construct his Gödel numbers because, in the same 
way that the prime numbers are intuitively perceived to be the primitive components of a natural 
number, the symbols of a formula are its primitive components. Therefore, due to how the Gödel 
numbers are constructed, a Gödel number relates to a formula in the same way that a natural 
number relates to its prime components. Hence, this construction of Gödel numbers serves to lend 
credence to the intuitive idea that the formulas in a formal system may be treated as mathematical 
objects or numeric objects within a mathematical system based on the concepts of arithmetic. 
 
The principal assertion of the arithmetization of syntax is that the Gödel number of every formula 
in a formal system exists and is a unique natural number and that the Gödel number of every finite 
sequence of formulas in a formal system also exists and is a unique natural number. Hence, since 
every deductive proof in a formal system is some finite sequence of formulas, this allowed Gödel 
to treat the formulas and the deductive proofs in a formal system as numbers in a mathematical 
system. Furthermore, since the arithmetization of syntax also permits the complete enumeration of 
every formula as well as every deductive proof in a formal system in the same way that every 
natural number may be completely enumerated, this allowed Gödel to quantify and thus reason 
over the totality of every formula and every deductive proof in a formal system. 
 
A more modern exposition of the arithmetization of syntax that includes a formal definition of the 
one-to-one correspondence between the well-formed formulas in a formal system and the natural 
numbers is provided in Appendix A: Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax. 
2.5 The Fundamental Concepts of Proof and Truth 
Prior to the publication of Gödel’s proof the discussion about mathematical proofs in the literature 
generally consisted of whether a formula was true or not and whether the truth of a formula could 
be conclusively proven within a formal mathematical system. This is an inherently naïve and 
uncritical view of the concepts of proof and truth. The naïve view of the concepts of proof and 
truth explicitly assumes that a proof is a representation of truth. However, this is an invalid 
objectification of the inherently subjective concept of truth. The concept of proof is an inherently 
objective concept due to the formal nature of a proof whereas the concept of truth is an inherently 
subjective concept due to the informal and thus intrinsically subjective nature of the concept of 
truth. As a result, what can be proven within any formal system and what may be considered to be 
actually true are fundamentally different and even potentially incommensurate ideas. 
 
The primary focus of Gödel’s proof was the proof-theoretic concept of proof or, more specifically, 
what can be deductively proven within any formal axiomatic system that is based on the principles 
of elementary arithmetic and mathematical logic. The concepts of proof and truth and how they 
are related is crucial to understanding Gödel’s proof because the exclusive focus of Gödel’s proof 
was to determine what can be inferred from the axioms of a formal axiomatic system without any 
explicit regard for what those axioms may or may not be true of and thus, by extension, without 
any explicit regard for what may or may not actually be true. 
 
Since a concept of truth may only be circularly defined as what is true, a naïve and uncritical view 
of Gödel’s proof naturally leads to many speculative and unjustified interpretations of what Gödel 
actually proved. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid any such speculative assumptions we will 
simply define three propositions that attempt to characterize the truth of proof within any formal 
system and are, for the most part, well known and not controversial. These propositions are 
explicitly stated because, regardless of their seemingly obvious validity, they are often violated 
when speaking about what is true in mathematics. 
 
Within the context of a formal system, the concept of truth is synonymous with what can proven 
within the system. 
The Truth of Proof, Proposition 1: within any formal system it is never valid to speak about 
truth or what is, in reality, true or false, but only about what can and cannot be proven. 
Although this proposition implicitly relates the concepts of truth and reality, no such relationship 
is actually asserted to exist. Some philosophies of mathematics propose that mathematical truth is 
not dependent on being practical or realistic and this proposition is not intended to refute that 
perspective. Hence, the idea that is expressed within the proposition by the term reality must be 
interpreted as being just as subjective and open to interpretation as the idea expressed by the term 
truth. What is implicitly suggested by contrasting these ideas is more important than whether any 
explicit and definable relationship actually exists between them. 
 
Within the context of a formal axiomatic system, a proof only represents what can be inferred 
from the axioms of the system. 
The Truth of Proof, Proposition 2: the truth of a proof within any formal axiomatic system is 
absolutely relative to the scope and validity of the axioms of the system. 
The term scope refers to the universe that the axioms are applicable to and the term validity refers 
to the extent of that applicability or how correct the axioms are within that universe. We use the 
term absolutely relative to imply that the scope and validity of any formal axiomatic system is 
inextricably dependant on and thus also constrained by the scope and validity of its axioms. 
 
A formal axiomatic system is merely the formal analogue of the intuitive idea that is basis of the 
system. We call this intuitive idea the naïve theory. 
The Truth of Proof, Proposition 3: the naïve theory of a formal axiomatic system, which the 
axioms of the system attempt to formally characterize, defines truth within the system. 
In essence, this proposition is merely a reformulation of Tarski’s characterization of truth within a 
formal system ([6] pg. 273). Since metamathematics is customarily defined as the informal or 
semi-formal language that is employed to speak about formal mathematical languages and formal 
mathematical systems then metamathematics may be considered to be the language of the naïve 
theory of mathematics and mathematical logic. Hence, this proposition states that truth is defined 
within a formal axiomatic system by the metamathematical statements and methods that have been 
accepted as true, provided the analogous axioms and methods in the formal system are accurate 
formal characterizations of those metamathematical statements and methods. 
 
As a consequence, truth is unacceptable as a deductive premise in Gödel’s proof-theoretic formal 
system because a concept of truth can only be defined within metamathematics, by definition, but 
the proof-theoretic concept of proof that Gödel employed within his proof is defined entirely in a 
formal mathematical language. Although another concept of proof has been defined in modern 
metamathematics, which may be called a model-theoretic concept of proof, since this concept of 
proof is not defined entirely in a formal mathematical language then it is excluded as an acceptable 
method of proof within Gödel’s proof-theoretic formal proof. 
3. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY 
The notation that constitutes the basic framework of Gödel’s system will now be defined. Only the 
notation that is required to prove Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem along with some additional 
notation and terminology that is needed to explain Gödel’s Proof will be defined. Gödel’s full 
system is reproduced with updated notation and briefly described in Appendix B: Gödel’s System. 
 
We begin by defining the notation for stating a formal definition. In the following definitions x 
and y are employed as general, undefined variables. 
Definition: x ≡df y is read as “x is defined as y”. 
We will now define the standard logical operations: 
Negation (Logical NOT): ¬x ≡df the negation of x. 
Conjunction (Logical AND): x ∧ y ≡df the conjunction of x and y. 
Disjunction (Logical OR): x ∨ y ≡df the disjunction of x and y. 
Implication (Logical Conditional): x → y ≡df ¬x ∨ y 
Equivalence (Logical Biconditional): x ↔ y ≡df (x → y) ∧ (y → x) 
We also define the standard quantifiers from predicate logic: 
Existential Quantification: ∃x is read as “there exists some x”. 
Universal Quantification: ∀x is read as “for any x” or “for all x”. 
Although the preceding operations are the basic operations of mathematical logic and thus are 
found in any introduction to mathematical logic, the notation is explicitly defined because it is not 
always standard and was obviously different in Gödel’s proof. 
 
We will also explicitly define the notation for set membership, which is the most primitive 
operation of Set Theory, although the notation is standard in all modern texts. 
Set Membership: x ∈ Y ≡df x is a member of or contained in the set Y. 
Negation of Set Membership: x ∉ Y ≡df ¬(x ∈ Y ) 
We will use other standard mathematical notation without definition because it is assumed that the 
operations and their notation are well known. 
 
We will now briefly define some of the basic concepts of functions within a set-theoretic context, 
all of which are standard in modern texts. 
Function: f: X → Y ≡df the function f is a function from the set X to the set Y. 
The definition simply states that the function f takes arguments from the set X and returns values 
from the set Y. If a function is defined for every argument or every x ∈ X then it is called a total 
function, otherwise it is called a partial function. However, the concept of a partial function will 
not be needed in what follows and thus will not be explicitly defined. Hence, every function is 
assumed to be a total function. 
 
In the following definition we will employ the customary notation for multiple quantifiers. Hence, 
∀x0 ∈ X ∀x1 ∈ X is stated as ∀x0, x1 ∈ X, where x0 ∈ X and x1 ∈ X denote any members of X. 
Injective or 1-to-1 Function: ∀x0, x1 ∈ X (f(x0) = f(x1) → x0 = x1) 
A function is injective or 1-to-1 if the function never returns the same value for distinct arguments 
or equivalently the value of the function is a unique y ∈ Y for every distinct argument x ∈ X. 
Surjective or Onto Function: ∀y ∈ Y ∃x ∈ X (f(x) = y) 
A function is surjective or onto if every y ∈ Y is the value of the function for some argument or 
equivalently no y ∈ Y exists such that f(x) ≠ y for every argument x ∈ X. 
Bijective Function: ∀y ∈ Y ∃x0 ∈ X ∀x1 ∈ X (f(x0) = y ∧ [f(x1) = y → x0 = x1]) 
A function is bijective if every y ∈ Y is the value of the function for some argument x ∈ X and the 
value of the function is a unique y ∈ Y for every distinct argument x ∈ X. A bijective function is a 
function that is both injective and surjective. A bijection, which is what a bijective function 
establishes between the sets X and Y, is often referred to as a one-to-one correspondence. 
However, a one-to-one correspondence does not necessarily define a bijective function unless and 
only unless the set-theoretic definition of a function is assumed along with the Axiom of Choice 
from Set Theory. 
 
We will also note that if a function f is a bijective function then the inverse of f, typically denoted 
by f–1, always exists and is also a bijective function. If a bijective function is defined as f: X → Y 
then its inverse is also a bijective function and is defined as f–1: Y → X. However, the concept of 
an inverse function will not be needed in what follows and thus will not be explicitly defined. 
 
We will also further note that it is assumed to be obvious due to the meaning of a function that, for 
any function f, the function will always return the same value for the same argument, in symbols: 
∀x ∈ X ∀y0, y1 ∈ Y (f(x) = y0 ∧ f(x) = y1 → y0 = y1), where y0 ∈ Y and y1 ∈ Y denote any members 
of Y. However, this may not necessarily apply to a function that is implicitly defined by the Axiom 
of Choice from Set Theory. 
 
We will now define the least search operator from recursive function theory. Although the 
notation that we employ is due to Kleene ([4] pg. 279) and is the standard notation in most modern 
texts, it is different from the notation that Gödel employed in his proof. 
Least Search Operator: µx is read as “the least x”. 
The least search operator is defined in a similar manner to how the quantifiers from predicate logic 
were defined because the least search operator is effectively identical to the existential quantifier 
with the sole exception that the existential quantifier is concerned with any possible value of the 
variable x while the least search operator is specifically concerned with the least or smallest value 
of the variable x within some ordering of all the possible values of variable x. In general, the least 
search operator suggests the obvious and rudimentary method of searching for the least value of 
the variable x by employing a linear search through every possible value of the variable x, which is 
a search that begins by evaluating the first or smallest value of x and then progressively evaluating 
the next larger value of x until the desired value is found. 
 
Finally, we will define the notation that is not standard or that is specific to the present proof. 
Throughout the proof we will employ the symbols ϕ and Ψ to represent formulas. If a formula ϕ 
contains no free variables then ϕ is called a sentence, otherwise for any formula ϕ with one or 
more free variables: 
Formula with Free Variables: ϕ(x1, …, xn) ≡df ϕ has the n ≥ 1 free variables x1, …, xn. 
This notation may be employed in two different ways, which will be apparent from the context. 
When ϕ denotes a formula that has been specifically defined then the notation ϕ(x1, …, xn) merely 
indicates the free variables that actually exist in the formula, but when ϕ denotes a formula that 
has not been specifically defined then the notion ϕ(x1, …, xn) asserts that the formula ϕ contains 
the free variables x1, …, xn. Also note that each free variable xi in ϕ(x1, …, xn) does not denote a 
variable with a fixed subscript or a variable that is associated with any specific symbol or symbols, 
but rather simply denotes the ith free variable in the formula ϕ. 
 
For some formula ϕ(x1, …, xn) and some y1, …, yn, where each yi denotes a fixed value or is a free 
variable in ϕ(x1, …, xn): 
Substitution: ϕ(y1, …, yn) ≡df an m-tuple of fixed values c1, …, cm are substituted for m free 
variables in ϕ(x1, …, xn), where 1 ≤ m ≤ n and each fixed value is some yi in ϕ(y1, …, yn). 
Each of the m ≥ 1 fixed values c1, …, cm is a constant or a defined term with no free variables and 
if m < n then each yi in ϕ(y1, …, yn) that is not a fixed value must be the corresponding free 
variable xi in ϕ(x1, …, xn). The operation of substitution considers a formula to be a sequence of 
symbols and then, if applicable, substitutes some of those symbols for other symbols and thus 
constructs a different formula. Substitution is defined in Gödel’s formal system by his primitive 
recursive relation 31, although only for a single free variable (Appendix B: Gödel’s System or 
[1.a] pg. 167, within which Gödel uses the notation Sb(a xc ), where a is some ϕ(x1, …, xn), x is any 
one of the free variables in ϕ(x1, …, xn) and c is some fixed value). Subsequently, Gödel defined 
the notation for the substitution of multiple free variables in a footnote ([1.a] pg. 167 footnote 37), 
which is effectively equivalent to the notation that we have just defined. 
 
The present notation was chosen not only because it is more concise and thus more readable, but 
also because the notation includes more information than the notation that Gödel employed in his 
proof. Specifically, the notation explicitly indicates the free variables in the formula for which no 
fixed value is substituted and which are thus still free. 
 
We will now define the notation that represents the process indicated by the arithmetization of 
syntax (section 2.3: Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax). For any formula ϕ: 
Gödel Number of a Formula: [ϕn] = n 
For every formula ϕ the Gödel number of ϕ exists and is unique, in symbols: [ϕ] = n, where [ϕ] 
indicates the process of constructing the unique natural number n that is the Gödel number of the 
formula ϕ. Therefore, we use the notation ϕn to denote the formula whose Gödel number is n and 
then we use n to denote the natural number that is the Gödel number of the formula ϕn. 
 
Note that for any formula ϕm, if [ϕm(x1, …, xn)] = m then [ϕm(y1, …, yn)] ≠ m, where n ≥ 1 and one 
or more of the yi in ϕm(y1, …, yn) is a fixed value. This is because m is the Gödel number of the 
formula ϕm with the free variables x1, …, xn and thus [ϕm(x1, …, xn)] = m. Subsequently, if a fixed 
value is substituted for one or more of the free variables in ϕm(x1, …, xn) then a different formula 
is constructed. As a result, this formula has a different Gödel number and thus [ϕm(y1, …, yn)] ≠ m. 
 
We will now employ the present notation to define Gödel’s relations 45 and 46. 
Gödel’s Proof Relation: ϕx ProofOf ϕy ≡df ϕx is a finite sequence of formulas that constitutes a 
deductive proof of ϕy. 
This is Gödel’s primitive recursive relation 45 (Appendix B: Gödel’s System or [1.a] pg. 171, 
within which Gödel uses the notation x B y). 
Gödel’s Provability Predicate: Prov(ϕx) ≡df ∃n (ϕn ProofOf ϕx) 
This is Gödel’s relation 46 (Appendix B: Gödel’s System or [1.a] pg. 171, within which Gödel 
uses the notation Bew(x)). As stated in section 2.4: Effective Computability, this relation is not 
primitive recursive because the existential quantifier in the definition is not explicitly bounded. 
Hence, if a deductive proof of ϕx does not exist within the formal system and thus Prov(ϕx) is false 
then any linear search for a deductive proof of ϕx will never terminate. 
 
Gödel also defined the relations ProofOf and Prov relative to a formal system that was denoted by 
κ. Hence, Prov(x) referred to a proof within Gödel’s formal system and Provκ(x) referred to a 
proof within a formal system κ that is an extension of Gödel’s formal system and thus includes the 
axioms of Gödel’s formal system possibly along with other axioms. Since we will focus only on 
what Gödel proved within his formal system and not on what might possibly be proven within any 
extension of Gödel’s formal system then this notation will not be explicitly defined. However, it is 
to be understood that what Gödel proved within his formal system can also be proven within any 
extension of Gödel’s formal system, which Gödel stated in his proof ([1.a] pg. 173, where Gödel 
asserts ∀x (Prov(x) → Provκ(x))). 
4. GÖDEL’S PROOF 
We will first state Gödel’s theorem 5 without proof because it plays a crucial role in his proof and 
in what follows. 
Gödel’s Theorem 5: for any primitive recursive relation R(x1, …, xn), where n ≥ 1, there exists a 
primitive recursive numeric formula ϕ with n free variables such that: 
 1.  R(x1, …, xn) → Prov(ϕ(x1, …, xn)) 
 2.  ¬R(x1, …, xn) → Prov(¬ϕ(x1, …, xn)) 
Gödel intuitively defined theorem 5 as stating that any primitive recursive relation is definable 
within his formal system. Due to the definition of a primitive recursive relation, every primitive 
recursive relation has a primitive recursive function that implements or computes the relation. As a 
result, the deductive proof of the numeric formula ϕ(x1, …, xn) or ¬ϕ(x1, …, xn) is simply the 
explicit calculation of the primitive recursive function that implements or computes the relation 
within the formal system and this explicit calculation constitutes a deductive proof or refutation of 
the primitive recursive relation with which it corresponds for the specific numeric values that are 
substituted for its free variables. 
 
We will now begin Gödel’s proof by defining the relation Q: 
1: Q(x, y) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) 
Due to Gödel’s theorem 5 there is a numeric formula ϕq(x, y) that implements or computes the 
relation Q. Therefore, due to theorem 5 and the definition of the relation Q: 
2: ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) → Prov(ϕq(x, y)) 
3: ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y) → Prov(¬ϕq(x, y)) 
The formulas ϕp and ϕr are now defined: 
4: ϕp(x) ≡df ∀n ϕq(n, x) 
And then where p = [ϕp(x)]: 
5: ϕr(x) ≡df ϕq(x, p) 
Hence, it is immediate due to 5: 
6: ϕq(x, p) = ϕr(x) 
Substituting p = [ϕp(x)] for x in 4 and then due to 6: 
7: ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n ϕr(n) 
Finally, substituting p = [ϕp(x)] for y in 2 and 3 and then due to 6 and 7: 
8: ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(ϕr(x)) 
9: ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n) → Prov(¬ϕr(x)) 
First it is assumed that a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) exists, in symbols: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)). 
Therefore, if a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) exists then a deductive proof of ¬ϕr(x) must also exist 
for some value of the variable x, due to 9, in symbols: ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)). However, if the formal 
system is assumed to be simply consistent then a deductive proof of ¬ϕr(x) for some value of the 
variable x contradicts a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n). Subsequently, it is inferred that it cannot be 
the case that a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) exists, in symbols: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)). 
 
It is then assumed that a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n) exists, which is a deductive proof of the 
refutation of ∀n ϕr(n), and thus a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) cannot exist if the formal system is 
assumed to be simply consistent, in symbols: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)). This is also the result of 
the contradiction inferred from 9 as well. Therefore, if a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) does not exist 
then a deductive proof of ϕr(x) must exist for every value of the variable x, due to 8, in symbols: 
∀x Prov(ϕr(x)). However, if a deductive proof of ϕr(x) exists for every value of the variable x and 
a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n) also exists, this is what Gödel defined as an ω-inconsistency. As a 
result, if the formal system is assumed to be ω-consistent then a deductive proof of ϕr(x) for every 
value of the variable x contradicts a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n). Subsequently, it is inferred that 
it cannot be the case that a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n) exists. 
 
As a consequence, if the formal system is assumed to be simply consistent then a contradiction 
results from the assumption that a deductive proof of the sentence ∀n ϕr(n) exists. And if the 
formal system is assumed to be ω-consistent then a contradiction results from the assumption that 
a deductive proof of the sentence ¬∀n ϕr(n) exists, which is a deductive proof of the refutation of 
∀n ϕr(n). Therefore, since both assumptions result in a contradiction it is then inferred that a 
deductive proof of the sentence ∀n ϕr(n) cannot exist within the formal system and a deductive 
proof of its refutation also cannot exist within the formal system. Hence, the sentence ∀n ϕr(n) 
cannot be proven within the formal system and is thus undecidable within the formal system. ■ 
 
Furthermore, the sentence ϕp(p) can easily be seen to be true according to Gödel ([1.a] pg. 151). 
Since ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n), due to 7, and ∀n ϕr(n) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)), due to the definition of 
the formula ϕr and the definition of the relation Q, then ∀n ϕr(n) states that a deductive proof of 
the sentence ϕp(p) does not exist and thus ϕp(p) states that a deductive proof of itself does not 
exist, due to 7. However, as was just proven, ∀n ϕr(n) is an undecidable sentence and thus a 
deductive proof of the sentence ∀n ϕr(n) cannot exist, in symbols: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)). As 
a result, the sentence ϕp(p) is clearly true, due to 7. Hence, although the sentence ϕp(p) can clearly 
be seen to be true this does not contradict its formal undecidability because, according to Gödel, 
the truth of the sentence ϕp(p) is due to metamathematical considerations. 
 
In conclusion, the Gödel sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)) cannot be proven 
within the formal system and thus its truth cannot be decided within the formal system. However, 
its truth is implied by the proof of its undecidability. Therefore, it is asserted that the formal 
system is inherently incomplete because a legitimate sentence exists in the language of the formal 
system that can clearly be seen to be true, but which is undecidable within the formal system. 
5. THE CONCEPTS OF ω-INCONSISTENCY AND MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION 
We will begin with Gödel’s definition of ω-inconsistency. A theorem is defined as a sentence for 
which a proof exists within the formal system. The theory of a formal system is then defined as the 
set that contains every theorem as well as every axiom, in symbols: Th = {ϕ | Prov(ϕ)}, where ϕ 
denotes any sentence in the language of the formal system. Intuitively, the theory of a formal 
system is the set that contains every sentence in the language of the formal system that is true. 
Subsequently, Gödel defines an ω-inconsistent formal system as, ∀x (ϕ(x) ∈ Th) ∧ ¬∀x ϕ(x) ∈ Th, 
where ϕ(x) denotes any formula and the values of the variable x range over the natural numbers. 
This definition states that a deductive proof exists within the formal system for a formula ϕ(x) 
when any value is substituted for its free variable and a deductive proof also exists within the 
formal system for the negation of the sentence ∀x ϕ(x). As a result, an ω-inconsistency is often 
defined as a formal system within which a proof exists for every sentence ϕ(0), ϕ(1), ϕ(2), … as 
well as the sentence ¬∀x ϕ(x), where the values of the variable x range over the natural numbers. 
The definition of ω-inconsistency that we will use is effectively identical to Gödel’s definition, 
which is, ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ∧ Prov(¬∀x ϕ(x)), where the values of the variable x range over the 
natural numbers. 
 
Before constructing a precise and fully general definition of ω-inconsistency we will first define a 
bijective function that enumerates every possible value of the variable x. This bijective function is 
technically defined as: f: ℕ → X, where ℕ denotes the set of natural numbers and X denotes the 
set of every possible value that the variable x can take. We then also define xn = f(n), where n ∈ ℕ 
and xn ∈ X. If X is the set of natural numbers or X = ℕ then f is the identity function or f(x) = x and 
thus xn = f(n) = n. 
 
Therefore, for any formula ϕ(x) in some formal system and some bijective function f: ℕ → X and 
thus also xn = f(n): 
ω-inconsistency: ∀n ∈ ℕ Prov(ϕ(xn)) ∧ Prov(¬∀x ∈ X ϕ(x)) 
Subsequently, Gödel defined an ω-consistent formal system as a system that is not ω-inconsistent 
or a system within which both ∀n ∈ ℕ Prov(ϕ(xn)) and Prov(¬∀x ∈ X ϕ(x)) cannot be true for any 
formula ϕ(x) in the language of the formal system. 
 
We employed a bijective function within the definition ω-inconsistency even though the function 
that Gödel defined to construct the Gödel numbers was an injective or one-to-one function. This is 
justified because a bijective function can easily be constructed from Gödel’s injective function 
(Appendix A: Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax). 
 
We will now state the customary definition of the principle of mathematical induction. For any 
predicate (or definite property) P(n), where n ∈ ℕ: 
Principle of Mathematical Induction: (P(0) ∧ ∀n ∈ ℕ [P(n) → P(n+1)]) → ∀n ∈ ℕ P(n) 
This definition immediately follows from the axioms of Gödel’s system, specifically axioms I.3 
and IV.1 (Appendix B: Gödel’s System), where the predicate P is assumed to represent the 
formula in axiom IV.1. The principle of mathematical induction asserts that the truth of P(0), 
called the induction basis, and the truth of ∀n ∈ ℕ [P(n) → P(n+1)]), called the induction step, 
implies the truth of ∀n ∈ ℕ P(n). The P(n) within the induction step is called the induction 
hypothesis because the truth of P(n) is assumed for any arbitrary n ∈ ℕ during the proof of the 
induction step. Also within the induction step, the notation n + 1 denotes the successor operation. 
Although the successor operation S is customarily defined as S(x) = x + 1, the successor operation 
does not simply define addition by a constant, but rather expresses the concept of the next element 
or successor within some complete enumeration. 
 
Since the principle of mathematical induction only expresses the underlying concept that justifies 
a proof that employs the principle of mathematical induction, not its actual implementation, we 
will also define proof by mathematical induction within the context of Gödel’s proof. To construct 
the definition we first substitute Prov(ϕ(x)) for the predicate P(n) in the definition of the principle 
of mathematical induction, where ϕ(x) denotes a formula that defines the predicate P(n) within the 
formal system. This substitution is justified by Gödel’s theorem 5 if the predicate P is assumed to 
represent a primitive recursive relation and thus the formula ϕ represents a numeric formula that 
implements or computes the relation. We then add an additional provability predicate to indicate 
the proof of the induction step. And finally, we employ the bijective function f that was previously 
defined to broaden the applicability of the definition, which reflects how the proof is generally 
applied. As a result, the following definition follows from the axioms of Gödel’s formal system 
along with Gödel’s theorem 5. For any primitive recursive numeric formula ϕ(x) in some formal 
system and some bijective function f: ℕ → X and thus also xn = f(n): 
Proof by Mathematical Induction: (Prov(ϕ(x0)) ∧ 
   Prov(∀n ∈ ℕ [Prov(ϕ(xn)) → Prov(ϕ(xn+1))])) → ∀n ∈ ℕ Prov(ϕ(xn)) 
The definition asserts that if a proof of the induction basis ϕ(x0) exists and a proof of the induction 
step ∀n ∈ ℕ [Prov(ϕ(xn)) → Prov(ϕ(xn+1))] also exists then that implies that a proof of ϕ(xn) exists 
for every n ∈ ℕ or ∀n ∈ ℕ Prov(ϕ(xn)). The proof of the induction step consists of proving, for 
any arbitrary n ∈ ℕ, that a proof of the induction hypothesis ϕ(xn) can be transformed into a proof 
of ϕ(xn+1), where the notation n + 1 again denotes the successor operation and thus xn+1 indicates 
the successor of xn. 
 
Therefore, since the first conjunct in the definition of ω-inconsistency is the consequent in the 
definition of proof by mathematical induction, it is clear how the concepts of ω-inconsistency and 
mathematical induction may be related. Thus, at least superficially, the concept of ω-inconsistency 
postulates the possibility that, for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of a formal system, a proof 
by mathematical induction that proves that the sentence ϕ(xn) is true for every n ∈ ℕ is seemingly 
contradicted by another proof that proves that the sentence ¬∀x ∈ X ϕ(x) is true. 
6. THE INTUITIONISTIC ACCEPTABILITY OF GÖDEL’S PROOF 
Gödel stated that the proof of his first incompleteness theorem is constructive and thus also 
intuitionistically acceptable ([1.a], pg. 177). Therefore, in this section we will briefly examine 
what constitutes a constructive or intuitionistically acceptable proof. However, we will not be 
concerned with whether Gödel’s proof can be formulated within an intuitionistic system of logic, 
but rather with the foundational concepts upon which Gödel based his proof and whether those 
concepts may be considered to be constructive. 
 
Two primary assumptions in classical logic are considered to be intuitionistically unacceptable. In 
their most general form both assumptions pertain to what may be considered to be constructive 
and thus they also relate to what may be considered to constitute a finitary method of proof within 
Hilbert’s program. What may be considered to be constructive has never been conclusively 
defined because what is constructive is inherently related to the subjective idea of what is practical 
or realistic, which is opposed to what is theoretical or abstract and thus also potentially impractical 
and unrealistic. The two intuitionistically unacceptable assumptions that will be examined are 
identified in Kleene ([4] pg. 46 – 53), although they are not formally analyzed nor resolved by 
Kleene. Kleene merely employs the assumptions to define a restricted form of classical logic that 
is inadequate from both an intuitionistic and a classical perspective ([4] pg. 82, 162 – 163). 
 
The first and principal assumption of classical logic that is considered to be intuitionistically 
unacceptable is expressed by the formula ¬¬ϕ → ϕ, where ϕ denotes any statement or sentence. 
The principle underlying ¬¬ϕ → ϕ is not intuitionistically acceptable because the Law of the 
Excluded Middle or LEM is rejected within intuitionistic logic as being universally applicable. 
The LEM asserts that, for any statement or sentence ϕ, either ϕ or the negation of ϕ is true, in 
symbols: ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. As a result, if it is not the case that the negation of ϕ is true, in symbols: ¬¬ϕ, 
then ϕ must be true because ¬ϕ is not, in symbols: ¬¬ϕ → ϕ. Intuitionistic logic does not reject 
¬¬ϕ → ϕ because it is universally false, but rather because it is not necessarily true and hence 
possibly inapplicable depending on the context within which it is applied. 
 
Gödel assumed ¬¬ϕ → ϕ when he substituted the relation Q for the relation in 2 of his theorem 5. 
The result of this substitution is ¬¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) → Prov(¬ϕq(x, y)), due to the definition of 
the relation Q, but the result is stated as ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y) → Prov(¬ϕq(x, y)) in 3 of Gödel’s proof 
(section 4: Gödel’s Proof), which is due to the assumption of ¬¬ϕ → ϕ. By assuming ¬¬ϕ → ϕ 
within this context Gödel asserts that the primitive recursive relation Q must be either true or false. 
There is no other possibility. As a consequence, Gödel’s assumption of ¬¬ϕ → ϕ within this 
context is not necessarily intuitionistically unacceptable because it is obvious that a primitive 
recursive relation must actually be either true or false due to how the primitive recursive functions 
were defined by Gödel. 
 
The second assumption of classical logic that is considered to be intuitionistically unacceptable is 
related to the first and may be expressed by how the quantifiers are interpreted, defined and 
evaluated. Therefore, we will begin by considering two different interpretations of the existential 
quantifier. For any formula ϕ(x), if some specific defined value has been explicitly identified for 
which ϕ(x) is true then ∃x ϕ(x) simply reflects that ϕ(x) is true for this value. We will call this the 
constructive interpretation of the existential quantifier. However, if no specific defined value has 
been explicitly identified for which ϕ(x) is true then ∃x ϕ(x) is merely an abstract assertion that 
some value must exist for which ϕ(x) is true, although no such actual value may be known. We 
will call this the definitional interpretation of the existential quantifier. 
 
The constructive interpretation of the existential quantifier requires a specific defined value to be 
explicitly identified for which the formula ϕ(x) is true before the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) may be asserted 
to be true. As a result, any proof of ∃x ϕ(x) is required to find or construct a specific defined value 
for which ϕ(x) can be proven to be true. In contrast, the definitional interpretation of the existential 
quantifier does not place any such restrictions on when the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) may be asserted to be 
true nor on how it may be proven. However, in practice, if ∃x ϕ(x) is not proven constructively 
with a direct proof then it is typically proven with an indirect proof or a proof that employs the 
principle of reductio ad absurdum that then also requires ¬¬ϕ → ϕ to be assumed to be true. 
 
Next, we will consider the symmetrical definition of the quantifiers, which is how the quantifiers 
are typically defined. What we call the symmetrical definition of the quantifiers is when one of the 
quantifiers is taken as primitive and thus defined intuitively and then the other quantifier is 
formally defined in terms of it. If the existential quantifier is taken as primitive then the universal 
quantifier is formally defined in terms of it, in symbols: ∀x ϕ(x) ≡df ¬∃x ¬ϕ(x). Conversely, if the 
universal quantifier is taken as primitive then the existential quantifier is formally defined in terms 
of it, in symbols: ∃x ϕ(x) ≡df ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x). Gödel formally states the latter definition in his relation 
32.d (Appendix B: Gödel’s system). Subsequently, both of the equalities ∀x ϕ(x) = ¬∃x ¬ϕ(x) and 
∃x ϕ(x) = ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x) can then be proven to be true regardless of which quantifier is taken as 
primitive, although this also requires ¬¬ϕ → ϕ to be assumed to be true. As a result, the 
customary equalities, which are generically defined as ∀ = ¬∃¬, ¬∀ = ∃¬, ∃ = ¬∀¬ and ¬∃ = ∀¬, 
are then also true, which is why this definition is characterized as symmetrical. 
 
The symmetrical definition of the quantifiers formally asserts the definitional interpretation of the 
existential quantifier to be true because the symmetrical definition formally equates the two 
quantifiers and the universal quantifier does not have a constructive interpretation. The universal 
quantifier does not have a constructive interpretation because explicitly identifying an infinite 
number of specific defined values is clearly not practical or realistic. Hence, a formula that 
contains a universal quantifier that refers to a potentially infinite number of values cannot be 
proven constructively. Although a proof by mathematical induction may be considered to be a 
direct proof of such a formula because a proof by mathematical induction does not necessarily 
employ the principle of reductio ad absurdum, mathematical induction is not generally considered 
to be constructive and thus does not justify a constructive interpretation of the universal quantifier. 
 
Finally, we will consider how the quantifiers are evaluated or, more specifically, how any formula 
that contains one or more quantifiers may actually be implemented or computed. The general 
method that is employed to evaluate the existential or universal closure of any formula ϕ(x), which 
is ∃x ϕ(x) or ∀x ϕ(x) respectively, is some type of linear search through every possible value that 
the variable x can take. However, if the value of the variable x is not explicitly bounded within the 
formula ϕ(x) and the number of the possible values that the variable x can take is not finite then 
employing any type of linear search to evaluate ∃x ϕ(x) or ∀x ϕ(x) may potentially lead to an 
infinite search, which is a search that never terminates. Therefore, since an infinite search signifies 
a result that is effectively indeterminate then the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) or the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) may 
effectively be neither true nor false even though, theoretically, every sentence must ultimately be 
either true or false if the LEM and thus also ¬¬ϕ → ϕ are assumed to be true. 
 
The intuitive distinction between the constructive and definitional interpretations of the existential 
quantifier may not be especially relevant within every context, however, that is certainly not the 
case within the context of Gödel’s proof. Gödel’s provability predicate is defined in relation 46 as, 
Prov(ϕx) ≡df ∃n (ϕn ProofOf ϕx). Subsequently, for some specific defined sentence ϕm, if Prov(ϕm) 
is stated and proven, but the proof of Prov(ϕm) does not produce an actual proof of ϕm and does 
not indicate how an actual proof may be constructed then the proof of Prov(ϕm) merely proves the 
abstract assertion that a proof of ϕm must exist. However, to prove that a sentence is true it is 
customary to produce an actual proof of the sentence. It is not generally considered to be sufficient 
to prove that a proof of a sentence must exist without also indicating how an actual proof of the 
sentence may be constructed. Furthermore, an actual proof of a sentence also typically indicates or 
at least suggests why the sentence is actually true not merely why it must be true, which is a subtle 
but potentially meaningful distinction. 
 
As a consequence, since Gödel’s provability predicate clearly employs an unbounded existential 
quantifier then the predicate is not necessarily intuitionistically acceptable because an evaluation 
of the predicate may potentially result in an infinite search. Specifically, for some sentence ϕm, if 
Prov(ϕm) is not true, in symbols: ¬∃n (ϕn ProofOf ϕm), and the number of possible values that the 
variable n can take is infinite then an evaluation of Prov(ϕm) will not necessarily produce a result. 
Furthermore, if the symmetrical definition of the quantifiers is employed to define the quantifiers 
then ¬Prov(ϕm) = ¬∃n (ϕn ProofOf ϕm) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕm) and thus ¬Prov(ϕm) clearly does 
not have a constructive interpretation. However, Gödel is still able to assert that the proof of his 
first incompleteness theorem is constructive and thus also intuitionistically acceptable. This will 
be addressed in more detail in the next section. 
7. A METICULOUS INTUITIVE ANALYSIS OF GÖDEL’S PROOF 
We will now provide a detailed, line-by-line analysis of the proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem (section 4: Gödel’s Proof). 
7.1 Theorem 5 
Gödel’s theorem 5 states that for any primitive recursive relation R(x1, …, xn), where n ≥ 1, a 
numeric formula ϕ with n free variables exists such that R(x1, …, xn) → Prov(ϕ(x1, …, xn)) and 
¬R(x1, …, xn) → Prov(¬ϕ(x1, …, xn)). The first formula states that if the relation R is true for the 
specific numeric values x1, …, xn then a deductive proof of the numeric formula ϕ(x1, …, xn) exists 
that proves the truth of R(x1, …, xn) or proves that the relation R is true for the specific numeric 
values x1, …, xn. Subsequently, the second formula states the inverse, which is that if the relation R 
is false for the specific numeric values x1, …, xn then a deductive proof of the numeric formula 
ϕ(x1, …, xn) exists that proves the truth of the negation of R(x1, …, xn) or proves that the relation R 
is not true for the specific numeric values x1, …, xn. 
 
The principal role of theorem 5 within Gödel’s proof, which is of crucial importance to the proof, 
is that the theorem proves that, for any primitive recursive relation R and any specific numeric 
values x1, …, xn, R(x1, …, xn) can be proven constructively to be either true or false. Since Gödel 
defined a primitive recursive relation as a relation that can be implemented or computed by a 
primitive recursive function then a numeric formula ϕ that defines a primitive recursive function 
within the formal system must exist to implement or compute every primitive recursive relation. 
Subsequently, Gödel employed a proof by mathematical induction to prove that every primitive 
recursive function can be defined within his formal system. As a result, for any numeric formula ϕ 
that implements or computes a primitive recursive relation R and for any specific numeric values 
x1, …, xn, the finite computation of ϕ(x1, …, xn), which must be finite due to how Gödel defined 
the primitive recursive functions, may be considered to be a constructive proof of R(x1, …, xn). 
 
As a consequence, the finite computation of the numeric formula ϕ for the specific numeric values 
x1, …, xn constitutes a deductive proof of ϕ(x1, …, xn) and, since ϕ defines a primitive recursive 
function that implements or computes the primitive recursive relation R in theorem 5, the finite 
computation of ϕ(x1, …, xn) also constitutes a deductive proof of R(x1, …, xn). Therefore, although 
the first formula of theorem 5 is R(x1, …, xn) → ∃y (ϕy ProofOf ϕ(x1, …, xn)) and the second 
formula is ¬R(x1, …, xn) → ∃y (ϕy ProofOf ¬ϕ(x1, …, xn)), due to definition of Gödel’s provability 
predicate, the unbounded existential quantifier in the formulas will not result in an infinite search 
because the proof of theorem 5 along with the definition of the primitive recursive functions 
indicates precisely how an actual deductive proof of ϕ(x1, …, xn) and thus also R(x1, …, xn) can be 
constructed. Hence, a search is not required and thus an infinite search will never result. 
7.2 The Relation Q 
To begin his proof Gödel defined the relation Q as Q(x, y) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)), which states 
that the relation Q(x, y) is true for the values x and y if it is not the case that x = [ϕx] is the Gödel 
number of a finite sequence of formulas and ϕx constitutes a deductive proof of the sentence ϕy(y). 
The sentence ϕy(y) is the result of substituting the value y = [ϕy(x)] for the single free variable in 
the formula ϕy(x). Hence, the Gödel number of the formula ϕy(x) serves as a fixed value, often 
called a fixed point, with which to evaluate the formula ϕy(x). 
  
A formula with a single free variable is what Gödel called a class expression. A formula with a 
single free variable, such as ϕy(x), cannot be determined to be either true or false until some value 
has been substituted for its free variable. A simple example is the formula “x + 2 = 3”. The 
formula “x + 2 = 3” is neither true nor false until some specific number is substituted for the 
variable x. Thus, if x = 1 then “1 + 2 = 3” is true and if x = 2 then “2 + 2 = 3” is false. Therefore, 
Gödel called a formula with a single free variable, such as ϕy(x), a class expression because it 
segregates every possible value of its single free variable into two distinct classes or sets of values, 
which are the set of every possible value of its free variable for which the formula is true and the 
set of every possible value of its free variable for which the formula is false. 
 
Hence, Gödel chose to use the Gödel number of the formula ϕy(x) itself to serve as a fixed value 
for which the formula could be determined to be either true or false. This may seem arbitrary or 
even contrived because then only the sentences ϕ0(0), ϕ1(1), ϕ2(2), … will be evaluated by the 
relation Q. But, Gödel could have defined the relation Q with three free variables instead of two, 
in symbols: Q(x, y, z) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(z)), which states that the relation Q(x, y, z) is true if it is 
not the case that x = [ϕx] is the Gödel number of a finite sequence of formulas and ϕx constitutes a 
deductive proof of the formula y = [ϕy(x)] when the value z is substituted for the single free 
variable in the formula ϕy(x). However, since Gödel only needed to evaluate the relation Q(x, y, z) 
when z = y to carry out his proof, which would thus be Q(x, y, y), he simply defined the relation Q 
with two free variables to make the proof more concise. 
 
Since the relation ProofOf is primitive recursive and thus the relation Q is also primitive recursive, 
Gödel then substitutes the primitive recursive relation Q for the relation in theorem 5. As a result, 
there exists a numeric formula that implements or computes the primitive recursive relation Q, 
which is denoted by ϕq, and thus: 
1: Q(x, y) = ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) → Prov(ϕq(x, y)) 
2: ¬Q(x, y) = ¬¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) = ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y) → Prov(¬ϕq(x, y)) 
Q(x, y) = ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) due to the definition of the relation Q. Hence, 1 states that if the 
relation Q is true for the numeric values x and y then a proof of the numeric formula ϕq(x, y) exists 
that proves that ϕq(x, y) is true for those values. Similarly, ¬Q(x, y) = ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y) due to the 
definition of the relation Q along with ¬¬ϕ → ϕ. Hence, 2 states that if the relation Q is not true 
for the numeric values x and y then a proof of the numeric formula ϕq(x, y) exists that proves that 
ϕq(x, y) is not true for those values. The proof of the numeric formula ϕq(x, y) in both 1 and 2 is 
the finite computation of ϕq(x, y) that constitutes a deductive proof of ϕq(x, y), which must exist 
because the numeric formula ϕq(x, y) defines a primitive recursive function. 
7.3 The Relations P and R 
Gödel defined the relation P in terms of the relation Q as ϕp(x) ≡df ∀n ϕq(n, x). Thus, if the 
variable x is replaced by y for clarity, P(y) ≡df ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕy(y)) due to the definition of the 
relation Q. Hence, the definition states that the relation P(y) is true for the value y if for every 
possible value of the variable n it is not the case that both n = [ϕn] is the Gödel number of a finite 
sequence of formulas and ϕn constitutes a deductive proof of the sentence ϕy(y). Again, the 
sentence ϕy(y) is the result of substituting the value y = [ϕy(x)] for the single free variable in the 
formula ϕy(x). The relation intuitively states that P(y) is true for any numeric value y if a deductive 
proof of the sentence ϕy(y) does not exist. We also note that, like Gödel’s provability predicate, the 
relation P is not primitive recursive. 
 
Gödel then defined the relation R in terms of both of the relations Q and P as ϕr(x) ≡df ϕq(x, p), 
where p = [ϕp(x)]. Thus, R(x) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) due to the definition of the relation Q. 
Hence, the definition states that the relation R(x) is true for the value x if it is not the case that both 
x = [ϕx] is the Gödel number of a finite sequence of formulas and ϕx constitutes a deductive proof 
of the sentence ϕp(p). The sentence ϕp(p) is the result of substituting the value p = [ϕp(x)] for the 
single free variable in the formula ϕp(x). As a result, ϕp(p) denotes the relation P with its own 
Gödel number substituted for its single free variable. The relation intuitively states that R(x) is true 
for any numeric value x if x = [ϕx] does not constitute a deductive proof of the sentence ϕp(p). 
 
Gödel then states the equalities ϕq(x, p) = ϕr(x) and ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n ϕr(n). The equalities 
immediately follow from the definitions of the relations P and R. The equality ϕq(x, p) = ϕr(x) 
states that the relation Q(x, p), which is the relation Q(x, y) when the value of its second free 
variable is p = [ϕp(x)], is identical to the relation R(x). Thus, ϕq(x, p) is true for the value x when 
and only when ϕr(x) is true for the value x. The equality ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n ϕr(n) states that 
the relation P(p), which is the relation P(x) when the value of its single free variable is p = [ϕp(x)], 
is identical to the universal closure of the relation R(x) or ∀n R(n). Thus, ϕp(p) is true when and 
only when ∀n ϕr(n) is true. 
7.4 The Result 
Gödel then derives the two formulas upon which the result of the proof of his first incompleteness 
theorem is based. He does so by substituting the value p = [ϕp(x)] for the free variable y in 1 and 2 
(section 7.2: The Relation Q), which are 2 and 3 in his proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof). The result 
of this substitution is: 
3: ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) → Prov(ϕq(x, p)) 
4: ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p) → Prov(¬ϕq(x, p)) 
And then applying the equality ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n) to the relation in the antecedent and applying the 
equality ϕq(x, p) = ϕr(x) to the relation within the provability predicate in the consequent: 
5: ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(ϕr(x)) 
6: ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n) → Prov(¬ϕr(x)) 
As a result, 5 and 6 are 8 and 9 in Gödel’s proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof). 5 states that if ϕx is not 
a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) then a deductive proof of the numeric formula ϕr(x) exists for the 
value x, which comports with the definition of the relation because ϕr(x) is true for any numeric 
value x if x = [ϕx] does not constitute a deductive proof of the sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n). And 6 
states that if ϕx is a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) then a deductive proof of numeric formula ¬ϕr(x) 
exists for the value x, which also comports with the definition of the relation because ϕr(x) is false 
for any numeric value x if x = [ϕx] constitutes a deductive proof of the sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n). 
 
Gödel then describes the contradictions that result from 5 and 6 intuitively. However, we will 
formally derive the contradictions that Gödel intuitively inferred from 5 and 6. First, assume that 
some x = [ϕx] exists such that ϕx is a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) and thus: 
7: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) 
Due to the definition of Gödel’s provability predicate we can immediately infer from 7: 
8: Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) 
And then from 6 and 7, using modus ponens, we can infer: 
9: ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) 
But, if the formal system is assumed to be simply consistent then 9 contradicts 8. Therefore, 
assume that no x = [ϕx] exists such that ϕx is a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) and thus: 
10: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) 
And it is then further assumed that: 
11: Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) 
And then from 5 and 10, again using modus ponens, we can infer: 
12: ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) 
But, if the formal system is assumed to be ω-consistent then 12 contradicts 11. ■ 
 
It is first assumed that some x = [ϕx] exists such that ϕx is a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n), which is 
stated in 7. A contradiction then results from this assumption along with the assumption that the 
formal system is simply consistent. Therefore, it is assumed that no x = [ϕx] exists such that ϕx is a 
deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n), which is stated in 10, and then it is further assumed that a deductive 
proof of its refutation ¬∀n ϕr(n) does exist, which is stated in 11. A contradiction then results from 
the assumption that a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) does not exist as well as the further assumption 
that a deductive proof of its refutation ¬∀n ϕr(n) does exist along with the assumption that the 
formal system is ω-consistent. 
 
As a result, Gödel infers that ∀n ϕr(n) cannot be proven to be either true or false within the formal 
system because neither a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) nor a deductive proof of its refutation can 
exist within the formal system if the formal system is assumed to be simply consistent as well as 
ω-consistent. Gödel calls ∀n ϕr(n) an undecidable sentence because the truth of ∀n ϕr(n) cannot 
be decided within the formal system and thus he also calls the formal system incomplete because 
the system contains an undecidable sentence. Hence, Gödel further asserts that any formal system 
that is robust enough to include elementary arithmetic and mathematical logic must be inherently 
incomplete because the foundation of the formal system that Gödel employed to derive his result 
is constructed using only the most basic and widely accepted axioms and methods of elementary 
arithmetic and mathematical logic. 
 
Gödel further states that ∀x ϕr(x) can easily be seen to be true precisely because ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n) 
is an undecidable sentence and thus cannot be proven within the formal system. Since ∀n ϕr(n) 
cannot be proven within the formal system then a deductive proof of neither ∀n ϕr(n) or its 
refutation exists within the formal system and thus ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) is clearly true. 
However, ∀x ϕr(x) = ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)), due to the definition of the formula ϕr, the 
definition of the relation Q and the equality ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n). Hence, ∀x ϕr(x) is clearly true. 
 
Since a formal system is intuitively defined to be complete if every meaningful sentence in the 
language of the formal system can be proven within the formal system, the importance of the 
assertion that ∀x ϕr(x) is actually a true sentence is that the assertion refutes the potential criticism 
that the sentence ∀x ϕr(x) expresses a contrived or nonsensical statement and is thus meaningless. 
7.5 The Contradictions 
We will begin by defining ⊥1 ≡df ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) 
and ⊥2 ≡df ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)). ⊥1 denotes the first 
contradiction, which is the contradiction that is expressed in 7, 8 and 9, and ⊥2 denotes the second 
contradiction, which is the contradiction that is expressed in 10, 11 and 12. 
 
Gödel first interprets Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) in ⊥1 as a contradiction if the formal 
system is assumed to be simply consistent. This is justified because ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) states that 
¬ϕr(x) exists in the theory of the formal system for some fixed value that is a valid substitution for 
its free variable and thus ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) → Prov(¬ϕr(c)) for some fixed value c may be inferred. 
As a consequence, since Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(ϕr(c)) for any fixed value c, due to axiom III.1 
(Appendix B: Gödel’s System), then a deductive proof of both of the sentences ¬ϕr(c) and ϕr(c) 
exists within the formal system for some fixed value c and thus the formal system is simply 
inconsistent if Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) is true. 
 
Gödel then interprets Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) in ⊥2 as a contradiction if the formal 
system is assumed to be ω-consistent. This is justified simply because Gödel specifically defined 
Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) as an ω-inconsistency. Hence, the pertinent question is not how 
the contradiction is inferred, but why the assumption that the formal system is simply consistent is 
not sufficient to interpret Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) as a contradiction. 
 
If ¬¬ϕ → ϕ is assumed to be true then Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) = Prov(∃n ¬ϕr(n)), due to relation 32.d 
(Appendix B: Gödel’s System). Hence, if the existential quantifier is interpreted constructively 
then some fixed value c must exist such that Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(¬ϕr(c)). Subsequently, since 
∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) states that ϕr(x) exists in the theory of the formal system for any fixed value that is 
a valid substitution for its free variable then ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) → Prov(ϕr(c)) for any fixed value c 
may be inferred. As a consequence, a deductive proof of both of the sentences ¬ϕr(c) and ϕr(c) 
again exists within the formal system for some fixed value c and thus the formal system is simply 
inconsistent if Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) is true. Therefore, if the assumption that the 
formal system is simply consistent is not sufficient to interpret Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) 
as a contradiction then both Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(¬ϕr(c)) and ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) → Prov(ϕr(c)) 
cannot be inferred from the axioms of the formal system for any fixed value c. 
8. ROSSER’S PROOF 
We will first define Rosser’s proof relation and provability predicate. 
Rosser’s Proof Relation: ϕx Proves ϕy ≡df ϕx ProofOf ϕy ∧ ¬∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕy) 
The validity of Rosser’s proof relation immediately follows from the assumption that the formal 
system is simply consistent along with the validity of Gödel’s proof relation, which is employed 
within the definition. The definition states that the relation ϕx Proves ϕy is true if ϕx constitutes a 
deductive proof of ϕy and no z = [ϕz] exists such that z is smaller than or equal to x = [ϕx] and ϕz 
constitutes a deductive proof of the negation of ϕy. The value of the variable z is explicitly 
bounded within the definition so that, like Gödel’s proof relation, Rosser’s proof relation is also 
primitive recursive. 
Rosser’s Provability Predicate: Prov(ϕx) ≡df ∃n (ϕn Proves ϕx) 
The definition of Rosser’s provability predicate is essentially identical to the definition of Gödel’s 
provability predicate with the obvious exception that Rosser’s proof relation is employed within 
the definition instead of Gödel’s proof relation. Thus, like Gödel’s provability predicate, Rosser’s 
provability predicate is also not primitive recursive. 
 
The following formalization of Rosser’s proof is primarily due to Kleene ([4] pg. 208). We use 
Kleene’s formalization of Rosser’s proof because Rosser did not actually construct a formal proof, 
but merely implied how one could be constructed, whereas Kleene constructed a detailed and 
complete formal proof. An asterisk followed by a number refers to a formula that Kleene employs 
as an assumption within Rosser’s proof. These formulas will be listed without proof following 
Rosser’s proof. 
 
We will begin Rosser’s proof by defining the relation Q. The definition of the relation is 
essentially identical to how the relation is defined in Gödel’s proof except that Rosser’s proof 
relation is employed within the definition instead of Gödel’s proof relation. 
1: Q(x, y) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y) ∧ ¬∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕy(y)]) 
Again, due to Gödel’s theorem 5, there is a numeric formula ϕq(x, y) that implements or computes 
the relation Q. The formula ϕp is then defined identically to how it was defined in Gödel’s proof: 
2: ϕp(x) ≡df ∀n ϕq(n, x) 
Substituting p = [ϕp(x)] for x in 2 and then due to the definition of the relation Q along with *57b 
and ¬¬ϕ → ϕ: 
3: ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n (¬[ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)] ∨ ∃z [z ≤ n ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
Now, assume ϕp(p) and thus also Prov(ϕp(p)). Hence, there exists some fixed k = [ϕk] such that: 
4: ϕk ProofOf ϕp(p) 
And due to Rosser’s proof relation (and the assumption of simple consistency): 
5: ¬(ϕ0 ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)), ¬(ϕ1 ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)), …, ¬(ϕk ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)) 
Then, due to *166a: 
6: ∀z (z ≤ k → ¬(ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)) 
Due to 4 and 6, using ∃ and ∧ introduction: 
7: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p) ∧ ∀z [z ≤ x → ¬(ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p))]) 
Due to *58b and *86: 
8: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p) ∧ ¬∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
Due to *57b: 
9: ∃x ¬(¬[ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)] ∨ ∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
Finally, due to *85a: 
10: ¬∀x (¬[ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)] ∨ ∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
But, due to 3, this contradicts the assumption of ϕp(p). Therefore, assume ¬ϕp(p) and thus also 
Prov(¬ϕp(p)). Hence, there exists some fixed k = [ϕk] such that: 
11: ϕk ProofOf ¬ϕp(p) 
Then, due to *168: 
12: ∀x (x ≥ k → ∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
And again due to Rosser’s proof relation (and the assumption of simple consistency): 
13: ¬(ϕ0 ProofOf ϕp(p)), ¬(ϕ1 ProofOf ϕp(p)), …, ¬(ϕk–1 ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
Then, due to *166: 
14: ∀x (x < k → ¬[ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)]) 
Due to 12 and 14 and also *169: 
15: ∀x (¬[ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)] ∨ ∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
But, due to 3, this contradicts the assumption of ¬ϕp(p). ■ 
 
Due to 10 and 15 it is inferred that ϕp(p) cannot be proven within the formal system and thus the 
formal system is incomplete because ϕp(p) is an undecidable sentence within the formal system. 
Hence, the customary interpretation of Rosser’s proof asserts that the result of Rosser’s proof is 
identical to the result of Gödel’s proof of his first incompleteness theorem. Subsequently, since 
Rosser only required the assumption that the system is simply consistent within his proof it is then 
further asserted that Rosser’s proof renders the assumption in Gödel’s proof that the formal system 
is ω-consistent superfluous to a proof of incompleteness. 
 
We will now provide the list of formulas that were referenced within the preceding proof. The 
proofs of these formulas are due to Kleene ([4] pg. 118 – 198). Although we note that the proofs 
use Kleene’s system, not Gödel’s. The notation ⊢ denotes the proof-theoretic relation of deductive 
proof or, for some set of formulas Σ and some single formula ϕ, the notation Σ ⊢ ϕ states that the 
formula ϕ can be deductively proven from the formula or formulas in Σ. 
 
For any formulas ϕ and Ψ, where x and y are distinct variables, k is some fixed numeric value, and 
t is a term that does not contain the variable x: 
 
*57b. ϕ ∧ ¬Ψ → ¬(¬ϕ ∨ Ψ) 
*58b. ϕ → ¬Ψ ↔ ¬(ϕ ∧ Ψ) 
*85a. ∃x ¬ϕ(x) → ¬∀x ϕ(x) 
*86. ¬∃x ϕ(x) ↔ ∀x ¬ϕ(x) 
*166. ϕ(0), ϕ(1), …, ϕ(k – 1) ⊢ ∀x (x < k → ϕ(x)) 
*166a. ϕ(0), ϕ(1), …, ϕ(k) ⊢ ∀x (x ≤ k → ϕ(x)) 
*168. ϕ(t) ⊢ ∀x (x ≥ t → ∃y [y ≤ x ∧ ϕ(y)) 
*169. ∀x (x < t → ϕ(x)), ∀x (x ≥ t → Ψ(x)) ⊢ ∀x (ϕ(x) ∨ Ψ(x)) 
9. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GÖDEL’S PROOF AND ROSSER’S PROOF 
The principal difference between Gödel’s proof and Rosser’s proof is customarily attributed to the 
difference between the Gödel sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)) that Gödel employed in his 
proof and the Rosser sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p) ∧ ¬∃z [z ≤ n ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) 
that Rosser employed in his proof. As a result, the Rosser sentence is customarily assumed to be 
responsible for Rosser being able to prove the incompleteness of the formal system with only the 
assumption that the system is simply consistent, which apparently dispenses with the assumption 
in Gödel’s proof that the formal system is ω-consistent. The basis for this interpretation is due to 
Rosser’s assertion that his proof relation possesses properties that Gödel’s proof relation does not. 
 
However, we assert and will show that the crucial difference between Gödel’s proof and Rosser’s 
proof cannot be attributed to the difference between the Gödel sentence and the Rosser sentence. 
This will be accomplished by proving the formal system to be incomplete with the Gödel sentence 
while employing only Gödel’s formal system along with an additional explicit assumption that the 
system is simply consistent. Hence, the difference between the proofs must be attributed to other 
assumptions contained in Rosser’s proof. 
 
If a formal system is simply consistent then, for any sentence ϕ, both a proof of ϕ and a proof of 
its negation ¬ϕ cannot exist within the system. Both Gödel ([1] pg. 61) and Rosser ([3.b] pg. 231) 
state this definition of simple consistency. Hence, the simple consistency of a formal system may 
be defined generally as ¬(Prov(ϕ) ∧ Prov(¬ϕ)) = ¬Prov(ϕ) ∨ ¬Prov(¬ϕ). Therefore, due to the 
definition of Gödel’s provability predicate: 
Simple Consistency: ¬∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕ) ∨ ¬∃x (ϕx ProofOf ¬ϕ) 
Subsequently, by employing this definition of simple consistency: 
Theorem 1: Gödel’s assumption that the formal system is ω-consistent can be directly replaced 
by the explicit assumption of the simple consistency of the system. 
Proof: we will employ only Gödel’s formal system as it was defined in his proof along with the 
formal definition of simple consistency that was just defined. 
 
We will begin by defining the relation Q and the formula ϕp identically to how they were defined 
in Gödel’s proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof): 
1: Q(x, y) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕy(y)) 
Again, there is a numeric formula ϕq(x, y) that implements or computes the relation Q: 
2: ϕp(x) ≡df ∀n ϕq(n, x) 
Substituting p = [ϕp(x)] for x in 2 and then due to the definition of the relation Q: 
3: ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
Assume ϕp(p) and thus also Prov(ϕp(p)). Hence, due to the definition of the provability predicate: 
4: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
Due to relation 32.d (Appendix B: Gödel’s System): 
5: ¬∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
But, due to 3, this contradicts the assumption of ϕp(p). Therefore, assume ¬ϕp(p) and thus also 
Prov(¬ϕp(p)). Hence, due to the definition of the provability predicate: 
6: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)) 
Thus, due to 6 and the definition of simple consistency: 
7: ¬∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
And again due to relation 32.d: 
8: ¬¬∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
And then assuming ¬¬ϕ → ϕ: 
9: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) 
But, due to 3, this contradicts the assumption of ¬ϕp(p). ■ 
 
The proof can be intuitively stated simply and directly. The sentence ϕp(p) is equivalent to the 
sentence ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕp(p)) by definition, due to 3. Hence, the sentence ϕp(p) states that a 
proof of itself does not exist. Consequently, if it is assumed that ϕp(p) is true and thus also that a 
proof of ϕp(p) exists then ϕp(p) is false by definition, which is a contradiction. Subsequently, if it 
is assumed that ¬ϕp(p) is true and thus also that a proof of ¬ϕp(p) exists then a proof of ϕp(p) 
cannot exist, due to the simple consistency of the system, but if a proof of ϕp(p) does not exist then 
ϕp(p) is true by definition, which is again a contradiction. 
 
We will now examine Rosser’s actual proof ([3.b] pg. 233 – 234) to further substantiate our 
assertion that the difference between Gödel’s proof and Rosser’s proof cannot be attributed to the 
difference between the Gödel sentence and the Rosser sentence. Rosser stated in his proof that if 
his Rosser sentence is substituted for the Gödel sentence in Gödel’s proof then Gödel’s proof can 
be carried out exactly as Gödel did to construct an undecidable sentence within the formal system. 
However, if this is actually done and (ϕ ∧ ¬Ψ) → ¬(¬ϕ ∨ Ψ) along with ¬¬ϕ → ϕ are assumed to 
be true then 8 and 9 in Gödel’s proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof) become: 
8: (¬[ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)] ∨ ∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬∀n ϕr(n)]) → Prov(ϕr(x)) 
9: (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n) ∧ ¬∃z [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬∀n ϕr(n)]) → Prov(¬ϕr(x)) 
It is first assumed that a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) exists within the formal system and also that 
a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n) does not exist within the formal system with a Gödel number less 
than or equal to the Gödel number of the deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n). As a result, the antecedent 
of 9 can clearly be seen to be true for some x = [ϕx] and thus Prov(¬ϕr(x)) must be true for some 
value of the variable x. Subsequently, if the formal system is assumed to be simply consistent then 
Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∃x Prov(¬ϕr(x)) can be interpreted as a contradiction in precisely the same 
manner that it was interpreted as a contradiction in Gödel’s proof. 
 
It is then assumed that a deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n) exists within the formal system and also 
that a deductive proof of ∀n ϕr(n) does not exist within the formal system with a Gödel number 
less than the Gödel number of the deductive proof of ¬∀n ϕr(n). Hence, ϕz ProofOf ¬∀n ϕr(n) is 
true for some z = [ϕz] and thus [z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬∀n ϕr(n)] is true for every value of the 
variable x that is greater than or equal to this z and ¬[ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)] is true for every value 
of the variable x that is smaller than this z. As a result, the antecedent of 8 can clearly be seen to be 
true for every value of the variable x and thus Prov(ϕr(x)) must also be true for every value of the 
variable x. However, Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) is still an ω-inconsistency and thus, unless 
something more is assumed, the assumption that the formal system is ω-consistent is still required 
to interpret Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) as contradiction. 
 
The crucial difference between Gödel’s proof and Rosser’s proof that allowed Rosser to dispense 
with the assumption in Gödel’s proof that the formal system is ω-consistent is Rosser’s concept of 
what constitutes a proof. Rosser employed a metamathematical concept of validity in his proof 
that necessarily supplanted the concept of proof-theoretic deductive proofs employed by Gödel in 
his proof. The concept of validity that Rosser employed in his proof may be clearly illustrated by 
examining the properties of Rosser’s proof relation. 
 
In Rosser’s proof he stated that his proof relation possesses certain properties that Gödel’s proof 
relation does not posses and that these properties allow him to dispense with Gödel’s assumption 
that the formal system is ω-consistent. The specific properties were formally defined by Rosser as 
Prov(ϕn) → Prov(ϕm) and Prov(¬ϕn) → Prov(¬ϕm), where ϕn is any sentence and m = [Prov(ϕn)]. 
Thus, ϕm denotes the sentence Prov(ϕn). Subsequently, Rosser stated that since it was clear that 
Prov(ϕm ↔ ∃x [ϕx ProofOf ϕn ∧ ¬∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)]) is true then Prov(ϕn) → Prov(ϕm) 
is also true. However, ϕm = Prov(ϕn) = ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕn ∧ ¬∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)), due to 
the definitions of Rosser’s provability predicate and proof relation, and thus the equivalence is 
obviously true by definition. As a result, since Prov(ϕm) = Prov(Prov(ϕn)) then it is also obvious 
that Rosser assumed that the truth of Prov(ϕn) is sufficient to infer that a proof of Prov(ϕn) exists. 
 
The reasoning that Rosser employed to prove that Prov(¬ϕn) → Prov(¬ϕm) is true is analogous to 
the reasoning that he employed to prove that Prov(ϕn) → Prov(ϕm) is true. First, Rosser proved 
that if a proof of ¬ϕn exists then ∀x (¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕn) ∨ ∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)) is true. Thus, 
since ¬Prov(ϕn) = ∀x (¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕn) ∨ ∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)), due to the definitions of 
Rosser’s provability predicate and proof relation as well as assuming ¬∃x ϕ(x) → ∀x ¬ϕ(x) and 
¬¬ϕ → ϕ, then Prov(¬ϕn) → ¬Prov(ϕn) is true. Hence, Rosser stated that Prov(¬ϕn) → Prov(¬ϕm) 
is also true. As a result, since Prov(¬ϕm) = Prov(¬Prov(ϕn)) then it is again obvious that Rosser 
assumed that the truth of ¬Prov(ϕn) is sufficient to infer that a proof of ¬Prov(ϕn) exists. 
 
Therefore, the principal assumption underlying the concept of validity that Rosser employed in his 
proof is, for any formula ϕ(x), both ϕ(x) → Prov(ϕ(x)) and ¬ϕ(x) → Prov(¬ϕ(x)) are true, which 
Rosser assumed without proof or any explicit justification. This assumption is also evident in the 
preceding proof of theorem 1 within the statement of the assumptions in 4 and 6. Although this 
assumption is similar to what Gödel proved with his theorem 5, the assumption cannot be justified 
by Gödel’s theorem 5 because the relation in the antecedent of the theorem is required to be 
primitive recursive and neither Prov(ϕn) = ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ϕn ∧ ¬∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)) or 
¬Prov(ϕn) = ∀x (¬(ϕx ProofOf ϕn) ∨ ∃z (z ≤ x ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕn)) is primitive recursive due to the 
unbounded quantifiers within their definitions. Furthermore, Rosser rejected primitive recursion as 
a basis of his proof because he stated that his proof, which is based on recursive and recursively 
enumerable sets, is more general than Gödel’s proof, which is based on primitive recursion and 
proof-theoretic deductive proofs. 
 
As a consequence, the crucial difference between Gödel’s proof and Rosser’s proof is that Gödel’s 
proof may be considered to be constructive whereas Rosser’s proof contains assumptions that are 
not generally considered to be constructive. However, this can only be stated informally because a 
formal analogue of what is generally considered to be constructive does not exist and thus it 
cannot be formally proven. 
 
Finally, it is of interest to explicitly note that the Rosser sentence that Rosser employed in his 
proof is primitive recursive and thus it is considered to be constructive whereas the definition of 
simple consistency employed in the preceding proof of theorem 1 is not primitive recursive and 
thus it is not considered to be constructive. However, since Rosser’s proof contains additional 
assumptions that are not generally considered to be constructive then the fact that the definition of 
simple consistency is not primitive recursive is immaterial to the primary objective of the theorem. 
10. TARSKI, MOSTOWSKI AND ROBINSON’S PROOF 
Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson constructed a metamathematical proof that they claim is simpler 
and more general than Gödel’s proof ([5] pg. 46 – 47). Instead of requiring the formal system in 
their proof to be capable of defining the entire class of primitive recursive functions, they simply 
require the formal system to be capable of constructing a bijective function between the formulas 
in the language of the system and the natural numbers. Hence, intuitively, they merely require an 
implementation of the metamathematical notion of the arithmetization of syntax. And instead of 
requiring the formal system in their proof to be capable of defining the proof-theoretic concept of 
deductive proof, which is the concept of provability employed in Gödel’s proof, they merely 
require the informal and thus purportedly more general concept of validity within the formal 
system. Hence, intuitively, the metamathematical concept of validity employed in their proof 
accommodates any definition of what constitutes a valid formula within the formal system, which 
includes any model-theoretic concept of proof. 
 
The basis of their proof is the notion of definability within the formal system, which we will now 
describe. For any function f: ℕn → ℕ, where ℕ denotes the set of natural numbers and ℕn denotes 
the set of n-tuples of natural numbers, the function f is definable within the formal system if some 
formula ϕ(x1, …, xn, y) exists within the formal system such that f(x1, …, xn) = y ↔ ϕ(x1, …, xn, y). 
And then for any set S, the set S is definable within the formal system if some formula ϕ(x) exists 
within the formal system such that s ∈ S ↔ ϕ(s) and thus also s ∉ S ↔ ¬ϕ(s). 
 
Finally, T will be employed to denote any formal system that meets the preceding requirements, 
which is any formal system within which the arithmetization of syntax and any notion of validity 
within the formal system can be formalized. In addition, as in Gödel’s proof [ϕ] will be employed 
to denote the unique natural number that is the Gödel number of the formula ϕ in T and ϕn will be 
employed to denote the formula in T whose Gödel number is n and thus [ϕn] = n. 
Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson: within any formal system T that is simply consistent, the 
diagonal function fd(n) = [ϕn(n)] and the set V that contains the Gödel numbers of all the valid 
sentences in T are not both definable within T. 
Proof: assume the contrary, which is that the diagonal function fd: ℕ → ℕ and the set V are both 
definable within the formal system T. As a result, the formulas Φ(x, y) and Ψ(x), which define the 
diagonal function and the set V respectively, must both exist within T. Therefore: 
1: fd(x) = y ↔ Φ(x, y)  
2: n ∈ V ↔ Ψ(n) 
3: n ∉ V ↔ ¬Ψ(n) 
Next, the formula ϕm(x) is defined: 
4: ϕm(x) ≡df ∀n (Φ(x, n) → ¬Ψ(n)) 
Substituting m = [ϕm(x)] for x in 4: 
5: ϕm(m) = ∀n (Φ(m, n) → ¬Ψ(n)) 
And then due to 1 with x = m: 
6: fd(m) = y ↔ Φ(m, y) 
And due to the definition of the diagonal function: 
7: fd(m) = [ϕm(m)] 
If the sentence ϕm(m) is true in T then the sentence ¬Ψ(fd(m)) is also true in T, due to 5, 6 and 7. 
Inversely, if the sentence ϕm(m) is not true in T then ϕm(m) is not valid in T and thus fd(m) ∉ V is 
true in T, due to 7 and the definition of the set V, and then the sentence ¬Ψ(fd(m)) is also true in T, 
due to 3. Therefore, in either case: 
8: The sentence ¬Ψ(fd(m)) is true within the formal system T. 
However, the sentence ∀n (Φ(m, n) → ¬Ψ(n)) is true in T, due to 1, 7 and 8, and thus ϕm(m) is 
true in T, due to 5. Since ϕm(m) is true in T then ϕm(m) is valid in T and thus fd(m) ∈ V is true in T, 
due to 7 and the definition of the set V, but then due to 2: 
9: The sentence Ψ(fd(m)) is true within the formal system T. 
Consequently, due to 8 and 9, the formal system T is simply inconsistent. ■ 
 
The proof that Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson constructed is inherently metamathematical 
because the proof does not contain explicit formal definitions of the arithmetization of syntax and 
the concept of validity within the formal system. Therefore, although it is claimed that the proof is 
simpler and more general than Gödel’s proof, the proof crucially relies on the formal definitions 
constructed by Gödel in his proof to assert that the proof is not entirely theoretical. Hence, the 
proof is simpler only in the sense that it does not include those formal definitions. However, the 
proof is indeed more general than Gödel’s proof in the sense that Gödel’s proof is inherently 
proof-theoretic, due to Gödel’s exclusive focus on deductive proofs, whereas this proof is applies 
to any formal system that is capable of defining any concept of validity within the formal system. 
 
Although Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson’s metamathematical proof cannot supplant Gödel’s 
constructive proof, their proof may be considered to entirely supersede Rosser’s proof because 
their proof is at least as general as Rosser’s proof and may also be considered to be simpler. Gödel 
stated that his first incompleteness theorem applies to any formal system that satisfies three 
requirements ([1.a] pg. 181). These requirements are, (1) the primitive recursive functions can be 
defined within the formal system, (2) for any enumeration of the formulas in the language of the 
system, n ∈ V ↔ ¬Prov(ϕn(n)) can be defined within the formal system, and finally (3) the formal 
system is ω-consistent. It has already been described how Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson’s 
proof satisfies the first two requirements, but their proof, like Rosser’s proof, apparently dispenses 
with the last requirement. 
 
In conclusion, similar to the Gödel sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)) and the Rosser 
sentence ϕp(p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p) ∧ ¬∃z [z ≤ n ∧ ϕz ProofOf ¬ϕp(p)]) the Tarski, Mostowski 
and Robinson sentence ϕm(m) = ∀n (Φ(m, n) → ¬Ψ(n)) states that the sentence ϕm(m) is not valid 
and thus the sentence states that itself is not true. 
11. SUMMARY 
In the preceding formal analysis we attempted to compose a comprehensive as well as intuitively 
meaningful explication of the proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem without violating one 
of the primary objectives of our proof by introducing interpretations or suppositions that cannot be 
directly justified by what is contained in Gödel’s proof. However, some of the questions raised by 
Gödel’s proof have never been formally resolved and thus they do not have a generally accepted 
solution. As a result, the preceding formal analysis is naturally and necessarily incomplete. 
 
Therefore, along with the expected intuitive summary of the concept of incompleteness as well as 
some additional theorems that are immediately implied by Gödel’s proof, the following summary 
will also include an examination of some of the questions raised by Gödel’s proof that could not 
be directly formally addressed in the preceding formal analysis. 
11.1 A Simple Intuitive Description of the Proofs of Incompleteness 
We begin with a simple, semi-formal metamathematical proof that reveals the underlying structure 
of the proofs of incompleteness. Only an undefined provability predicate will be employed in the 
proof, which may be considered to represent any formal definition of validity within the system. 
Therefore, for any sentence ϕ in the language of some formal system: 
1: ϕ → Prov(ϕ) 
2: ¬ϕ → Prov(¬ϕ) 
1 and 2 simply state that if the sentence ϕ or ¬ϕ is true then ϕ or ¬ϕ is provable within the formal 
system respectively. Since ϕ denotes any sentence in the language of the system, we then define: 
3: ϕ ≡df ¬Prov(ϕ) 
Thus, ϕ is defined as the sentence that states that itself is not provable. Hence, due to 3 and then if 
¬¬ϕ → ϕ is assumed: 
4: ¬ϕ = ¬¬Prov(ϕ) = Prov(ϕ) 
If ϕ is assumed to be true then Prov(ϕ) must be true, due to 1, but then ¬Prov(ϕ) must also be true, 
due to the definition of the sentence ϕ in 3, which is a contradiction if the system is assumed to be 
simply consistent. Subsequently, if ¬ϕ is assumed to be true then Prov(¬ϕ) must be true, due to 2, 
but then Prov(ϕ) must also be true, due to the equality in 4, which is a contradiction if the formal 
system is assumed to be simply consistent. The contradictions may be clearly seen by substituting 
the definition of ϕ in 3 for ϕ in the antecedent of 1 and 2 using the equality in 4. 
5: ¬Prov(ϕ) → Prov(ϕ) 
6: Prov(ϕ) → Prov(¬ϕ) 
It is of interest to explicitly note that the contradiction inferred from 1 and 3, which is expressed in 
5, requires the system, not the formal system, to be simply consistent. Although this reference may 
be interpreted as referring to the formal system, it may also be interpreted as referring to what 
could be called the metamathematical system, which is the purely theoretical system that expresses 
the naïve theory that is the foundation of the formal system. 
 
As a result, the source of the contradictions as well as the underlying paradox becomes evident, 
however, to unduly emphasize the paradox underlying the proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem would violate Gödel’s conceptualization of what his proof actually proved. This may be 
clearly seen in the following statement by Gödel ([8] pg. 179). In response to Wittgenstein’s 
comments about Gödel’s proof in Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, Gödel stated, “He 
[Wittgenstein] did not understand it (or pretended not to understand it). He interpreted it as a kind 
of logical paradox, while in fact it is just the opposite, namely a mathematical theorem within an 
absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics (finitary number theory or combinatorics).” 
 
In the preceding statement Gödel characterized the formal axiomatic system that he constructed in 
his proof as an absolutely uncontroversial part of mathematics because the axioms of his formal 
system consist of only well known and generally accepted axioms from elementary arithmetic and 
mathematical logic (Appendix B: Gödel’s System). Gödel’s definition of the primitive recursive 
functions, which defines the elementary operations of arithmetic within Gödel’s formal system, is 
fundamentally based on the Peano Axioms (Axioms I). The list of relations that Gödel defined in 
his proof, which culminate in the definitions of Gödel’s proof relation and provability predicate, 
are based on axioms from mathematical logic, specifically, axioms from Propositional Logic 
(Axioms II), Predicate Logic (Axioms III), and Set Theory (Axioms IV and V). 
 
Gödel’s characterization of his proof in the preceding statement then becomes clear when the 
principal objective of Gödel’s proof is considered. The objective of Gödel’s proof was stated in 
his second incompleteness theorem, which asserted that the formal system in Gödel’s proof could 
not prove its own simple consistency and thus his proof was to some extent a response to Hilbert’s 
program (section 2.2: Consistency, Completeness and Hilbert’s Program). As a consequence, since 
a formal system is simply consistent if no sentence exists in the language of the system such that 
both the sentence and its negation can be proven to be true within the system then the necessity of 
stating and proving the Gödel sentence or some equivalent sentence becomes clear. Hence, 
according to Gödel, it is this intrinsic necessity that transforms the Gödel sentence from a 
statement that may be perceived to be a contrived absurdity that is concocted merely to construct a 
logical paradox into a meaningful statement. 
 
The inadequacy of the preceding metamathematical proof and the logical paradox that it expresses 
may be clearly seen, at least in part, due to its inability to provide any insight into the role of the 
concept of ω-inconsistency within a proof of incompleteness. 
11.2 Two Formal Interpretations of the Concept of ω-inconsistency 
In [6.a] Tarski composed a formal set-theoretic definition of ω-consistency as well as what he 
called ω-completeness in an attempt to provide an intuitively meaningful characterization of the 
concept of ω-inconsistency. Therefore, we will employ a simple set-theoretic construction within a 
model-theoretic proof to illustrate the basic idea underlying Tarski’s definition of ω-inconsistency. 
 First, we define the set of every finite subset of the natural numbers, which we denote by Pω(ℕ), 
where ℕ denotes the set of natural numbers. We then define the bijective function f: Pω(ℕ) → ℕ 
as f(s) = ∑n∈s 2n, where s ∈ Pω(ℕ), n ∈ ℕ and ∑n∈s indicates the sum ranging over every n ∈ s. As 
is customary, we define the result of the empty summation to be 0 and thus f(∅) = 0, where ∅ 
denotes the empty set or the set that does not contain any members. As a result, since f is a 
bijective function then f is a one-to-one correspondence between Pω(ℕ) and ℕ and thus f is also a 
complete enumeration of every s ∈ Pω(ℕ). Hence, if sn denotes the s ∈ Pω(ℕ) such that f(s) = n 
then Pω(ℕ) = {s0, s1, s2, …}. Finally, we employ the customary notation ∪ to denote the standard 
set-theoretic operation of union and then also, for any n ≥ 0, we will employ the notation ∪n si to 
denote the union of the sets s0, …, sn or ∪n si ≡df s0 ∪ … ∪ sn. 
 
Therefore, we now employ a proof by mathematical induction to prove that the result of the union 
of every s0, s1, s2, … ∈ Pω(ℕ) or s0 ∪ s1 ∪ s2 ∪ … is a finite set or a set that contains a finite 
number of members. The induction basis is vacuously true because s0 = ∅ and ∅ is clearly a finite 
set. Next, to prove the induction step we assume the induction hypothesis or, for any n ≥ 0, the 
result of ∪n si is a finite set and then we prove that the result of ∪n+1 si must also be a finite set. 
Since ∪n+1 si = (∪n si) ∪ sn+1 then the result of ∪n+1 si must be a finite set because the result of the 
union of any two finite sets is clearly a finite set and the result of ∪n si is a finite set by hypothesis 
and the set sn+1 is a finite set by definition. As a consequence, it has been proven that the result of 
the union of every s0, s1, s2, … ∈ Pω(ℕ) must be a finite set. However, this cannot be true because 
for every n ∈ ℕ some s ∈ Pω(ℕ) exists such that n ∈ s, due to the definition of Pω(ℕ). Thus, the 
result of the union of every s0, s1, s2, … ∈ Pω(ℕ) is ℕ and ℕ is obviously not a finite set. 
 
A little reflection on the preceding proof by mathematical induction reveals the subtle flaw in the 
proof. It was asserted that what was to be proven by mathematical induction was that the result of 
the union of every s0, s1, s2, … ∈ Pω(ℕ) or s0 ∪ s1 ∪ s2 ∪ … is a finite set, but what was actually 
proven was that, for every n ≥ 0, the result of the union of s0,  …, sn ∈ Pω(ℕ) or ∪n si is a finite 
set. The difference between s0,  …, sn ∈ Pω(ℕ) for every n ≥ 0 and s0, s1, s2, … ∈ Pω(ℕ) was 
characterized by Tarski as the difference between the concepts of a potential infinity and an actual 
or completed infinity ([6.a] pg. 293). Thus, more careful reflection on the preceding proof and its 
apparent flaw reveals that if the concepts of a potential infinity and a completed infinity are not 
explicitly and clearly distinguished then the proof is not actually flawed, but rather the formal 
system within which the proof was constructed is ω-inconsistent, at least according to Tarski. 
 
Within this context the concept of a potential infinity might be more accurately characterized as a 
constructive infinity that is related to the concept of evaluated truth and the concept of a completed 
infinity might be more accurately characterized as a definitional infinity that is related to the 
concept of asserted truth. 
 
Subsequently, in [7.a] Quine defined an ω-inconsistent formal system as a system within which no 
comprehensive formal definition of the natural numbers exists in the language of the system. As a 
result, Quine called an ω-inconsistent formal system numerically insegregative ([7.a] pg. 118). A 
formal system that is numerically insegregative and thus also ω-inconsistent may be intuitively 
described as a formal system within which no formula exists in the language of the system that is 
true for every n ∈ ℕ. 
 
Quine used the following example to describe a numerically insegregative formal system: assume 
that some formula ϕ(x) exists in the language of the system such that ϕ(x) → x ∈ ℕ. However, 
since the system is numerically insegregative then some n exists such that ¬ϕ(n) ∧ n ∈ ℕ. Hence, 
ϕ(x) cannot be purported to define the natural numbers within the system. Subsequently, assume 
that some other formula Ψ(x) exists in the language of the system such that Ψ(x) → x ∈ ℕ and 
Ψ(n) is true for the n ∈ ℕ for which ϕ(n) is false. As a result, the formula Φ(x) ≡df ϕ(x) ∨ Ψ(x) 
exists in the language of the system and thus Φ(x) → x ∈ ℕ and Φ(n) is true for the n ∈ ℕ for 
which ϕ(n) is false. However, since the system is numerically insegregative then some m ≠ n 
exists such that ¬Φ(m) ∧ m ∈ ℕ. As a consequence, for any formula in the language of the formal 
system that may be purported to define the natural numbers within the system, some n ∈ ℕ will 
always exist for which the formula is false since the system is numerically insegregative. 
 
Tarski’s definition of ω-inconsistency attempts to address the question of why an ω-inconsistency 
might arise within any formal system whereas Quine’s definition of ω-inconsistency attempts to 
address the question of how an ω-inconsistency might arise within some specific formal system. 
Hence, the primary focus of Tarski’s definition is the inadequacy of any formal system to formally 
deal with the concepts of a potential infinity and a completed infinity whereas the primary focus of 
Quine’s definition is the inadequacy of any specific formal system to formally define and prove 
theorems about the entire infinite set of natural numbers. However, both definitions are to some 
extent inadequate due to their inability to clearly and conclusively resolve some basic questions 
about the concept of ω-inconsistency within the context of Gödel’s proof. 
 
One such question is expressed by the inequality ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ≠ Prov(∀x ϕ(x)), which must be 
true due to Gödel’s definition of ω-inconsistency. Gödel formally defined an ω-inconsistency as a 
formal system that may be simply consistent and within which ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ∧ Prov(¬∀x ϕ(x)) is 
true for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of the system. Thus, if ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) = Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) 
were true then Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) ∧ Prov(¬∀x ϕ(x)) would also be true in an ω-inconsistent system. 
However, if the system is also simply consistent then Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) ∧ Prov(¬∀x ϕ(x)) is clearly a 
contradiction because the negation of the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) is the sentence ¬∀x ϕ(x). As a result, if 
∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) = Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) were true then an ω-inconsistent formal system could never also be 
simply consistent, which contradicts Gödel’s definition of ω-inconsistency. 
 
Tarski’s definition of ω-inconsistency suggests that ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) signifies a potential infinity and 
Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) signifies an actual or completed infinity. However, the concepts of a potential 
infinity and a completed infinity remain mostly intuitive and thus also entirely theoretical. Hence, 
Tarski’s definition merely gives ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ≠ Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) an intuitive interpretation and is 
thus is incapable of formally analyzing or resolving the inequality within the context of Gödel’s 
proof. Tarski’s rule of infinite induction ([6.a] pg. 294), which is his proposed resolution of the 
inequality, reveals the inadequacy of Tarski’s definition within the context of Gödel’s proof. In 
essence, Tarski’s rule of infinite induction simply asserts that ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) → Prov(∀x ϕ(x)), but 
this has already been shown to contradict Gödel’s definition of ω-inconsistency. 
 
Quine’s definition of ω-inconsistency suggests that the language of an ω-inconsistent formal 
system is effectively incapable of defining a formula ϕ(x) that is true if and only if the value of the 
variable x is a natural number. As a result, an ω-inconsistent system is effectively incapable of 
defining the infinite set ℕ and is thus numerically insegregative. Therefore, Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) can be 
true in an ω-inconsistent system, but ∀n ∈ ℕ Prov(ϕ(n)) can never be true because ℕ cannot be 
defined within the system, which explains how ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ≠ Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) can be true when 
the values of the variable x range over the natural numbers. However, ℕ can be defined within the 
formal system in Gödel’s proof because axioms I (Appendix B: Gödel’s System) are based on the 
Peano Axioms, which are the de facto standard definition of ℕ. Thus, Quine’s definition is also 
inadequate within the context of Gödel’s proof. 
11.3 An Intuitionistic Interpretation of Gödel’s Concept of ω-inconsistency 
The intuitive foundation of Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency can be related to the fundamental 
difference between the constructive and definitional interpretations of the existential quantifier 
(section 6: The Intuitionistic Acceptability of Gödel’s Proof). The constructive interpretation of 
the existential quantifier essentially states that, for any formula ϕ(x), the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) asserts 
that some specific defined value of the variable x exists such that ϕ(x) can be proven to be true for 
this value, in symbols: ∃x ϕ(x) → ϕ(c), where c is some fixed value. And then the definitional 
interpretation of the existential quantifier simply states that some value of the variable x exists for 
which ϕ(x) is true, although no such actual value may be known. 
 
If a proof of the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) exists for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of a formal system, 
but a specific defined value of the variable x is not identified in the proof for which ϕ(x) can be 
proven to be true, then the definitional interpretation of existential quantifier has been assumed. If 
a specific defined value for which ϕ(x) is true is never identified then this would suggest that no 
such value actually exists and thus ∃x ϕ(x) is not actually true. However, a specific defined value 
for which ϕ(x) is true may actually exist although no such value is ever identified for whatever 
reason. Regardless, if the formal system within which the proof of the sentence ∃x ϕ(x) exists is 
simply consistent then the mere existence of the proof asserts that a proof of the sentence ¬∃x ϕ(x) 
cannot exist and neither can a proof of the sentence ∀x ¬ϕ(x) if ∀x ¬ϕ(x) → ¬∃x ϕ(x) is true. As a 
result, since a proof of the sentence ∀x ¬ϕ(x) cannot exist then the sentence ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x) can be 
inferred if ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (the LEM) is true. Conversely, if ∃x ϕ(x) → ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x) is true, which is justified 
by Gödel’s relation 32.d (Appendix B: Gödel’s System), then the sentence ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x) can be 
directly inferred from the proof of the sentence ∃x ϕ(x). In either case, if a specific defined value 
of the variable x has never been identified for which ϕ(x) can be proven to be true then the 
sentence ∃x ϕ(x) does not necessarily assert that a specific defined value exists for which ϕ(x) can 
be proven to be true and neither does the sentence ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x), in symbols: ¬∀x ¬ϕ(x) → ϕ(c) is 
not necessarily true for any fixed value c. 
 
Therefore, within Gödel’s proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof), Prov(¬∀x ϕr(x)) may be interpreted as 
stating that the existence of a deductive proof of the sentence ¬∀x ϕr(x) within the formal system 
does not then necessarily assert that ¬∀x ϕr(x) → ¬ϕr(c) is true for some fixed value c. Indeed, no 
specific defined value of the variable x was identified in Gödel’s proof for which ¬ϕr(x) can be 
proven to be true. As a consequence, since ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) is interpreted as stating that, for every 
fixed value c, a deductive proof of the sentence ϕr(c) exists within the formal system then the 
sentence Prov(¬∀x ϕr(x)) ∧ ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)), which expresses the concept of ω-inconsistency 
within Gödel’s proof, does not necessarily entail a simple inconsistency. 
 
Subsequently, we assert that unlike either Tarski’s or Quine’s definition of ω-inconsistency this 
interpretation of ω-inconsistency is capable of clearly expressing the precise difference between 
∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) and Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) and thus also why the inequality ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ≠ Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) 
is true (section 11.2: Two Formal Interpretations of the Concept of ω-inconsistency). 
 
Intuitively, for any formula ϕ(x), Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) states that a single deductive proof exists within 
the formal system of the sentence that states that ϕ(x) is true for every value of the variable x and 
∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) states that, for every value of the variable x, a deductive proof of ϕ(x) exists within 
the formal system for that individual value of the variable x. Therefore, it appears to be clear that 
both Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) and ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) reflect the same intuitive condition, which is that ϕ(x) is 
true within the formal system for every possible value of the variable x. 
 
Formally, for any numeric formula ϕ(x), it is clear that it can be inferred from the axioms of 
Gödel’s formal system that Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) is the result of proof that depends on the principle of 
mathematical induction because the only axiom in the system that will permit a deductive proof of 
the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) to exist within the system is axiom I.3 (Appendix B: Gödel’s System), which 
is a set-theoretic formalization of the principle of mathematical induction. And, for any primitive 
recursive numeric formula ϕ(x), it can be inferred from the axioms of Gödel’s formal system along 
with Gödel’s theorem 5 that ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) is the result of a proof by mathematical induction 
(section 5: The Concepts of ω-inconsistency and Mathematical Induction). Therefore, it appears to 
be clear that both Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) and ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) are, in essence, the same formal proof because 
they are both formal analogues of the metamathematical principle of mathematical induction. 
 
Therefore, in either case and within the context of Gödel’s proof, for any numeric formula ϕ(x), 
where the values of variable x range over the natural numbers, Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) represents a formal 
deductive proof of the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) from the premises: axiom I.3, ϕ(0), and ϕ(n) → ϕ(S(n)), 
where n denotes an arbitrary natural number and S denotes the successor operation. And, for any 
primitive recursive numeric formula ϕ(x), ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) represents a metamathematical proof of 
∀x ϕ(x) that is justified by the premise that a formal deductive proof of ϕ(x) must exist whenever 
the value of the variable x is any natural number. The proof is called metamathematical because its 
premise is a clear expression of the customary metamathematical interpretation of the result of a 
proof by mathematical induction, which states that the numeric predicate or formula that is the 
focus of the proof must be true for every possible natural number. Furthermore, the proof is clearly 
metamathematical because ∀x Prov(ϕr(x)) does not represent a formal deductive proof, but rather 
represents an actually infinite number of formal deductive proofs. 
 
As a result, although it appears to be clear that both Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) and ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) reflect the 
same intuitive condition as well as the same formal proof, Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) indicates that a formal 
deductive proof of the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) exists within the formal system, whereas ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) 
indicates that a metamathematical proof of ∀x ϕ(x) exists that states that a formal deductive proof 
of ϕ(x) exists within the formal system for every individual value of the variable x. Therefore, the 
inequality ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) ≠ Prov(∀x ϕ(x)) is true because each side of the inequality indicates a 
proof of ∀x ϕ(x) that is fundamentally and meaningfully different or is at least as fundamentally 
and meaningfully different as the constructive and definitional interpretations of the existential 
quantifier are considered to be. 
11.4 The Concept of ω-inconsistency 
The ω in ω-inconsistency refers to the transfinite ordinal number of the infinite set ℕ, which is the 
set that contains every natural number. The conceptualization underlying the ordinal ω is reflected 
in its set-theoretic construction, which characterizes the ordinal ω and thus also ℕ as completed 
infinite totalities that consist of an infinite number of discrete members. This metamathematical 
conceptualization is in contrast to the constructive conceptualization of ℕ, which characterizes the 
natural numbers as being constructed by a perpetually unfolding process that never terminates and 
is thus never complete. Hence, the concept of ω-inconsistency that Gödel introduced and defined 
in his proof may be interpreted as challenging the customary set-theoretic assumption that an 
infinite set is nothing more than the sum or aggregate of its infinite discrete parts, which is the 
assumption that is intimated by the ordinal ω and also by the cumulative hierarchy in Set Theory. 
 
The term inconsistency in ω-inconsistency refers to the concept of logical inconsistency, which is 
generally represented by its formal analogue of simple inconsistency. A formal system is defined 
to be simply consistent if no sentence exists in the language of the system such that both the 
sentence and its negation can be proven to be true within the formal system whereas a system is 
logically consistent if no two mutually absurd or contradictory statements exist within the system 
and both of the statements are true within the system. Hence, Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency 
may be interpreted as postulating the possibility of the existence of a proof within the system that 
states that some formula or property is true of every individual natural number along with the 
existence of another proof within the system that states that the same formula or property cannot 
be true of every possible natural number. 
 
Therefore, the conceptual difference between the two statements or conditions that constitute an 
ω-inconsistency in Gödel’s proof may be stated clearly and precisely. The statement that a formula 
or property is true of every individual natural number is a positive statement about what is true of 
each specific defined natural number whereas the statement that a formula or property is not true 
of every possible natural number is a nonspecific negative statement about what cannot be true of 
every natural number in general. Hence, Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency may be interpreted as 
postulating the possibility that, for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of a formal system, a proof 
exists that states that ϕ(x) must be true whenever the value of the variable x is any specific defined 
natural number and a proof also exists that states that the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) cannot be true when the 
values of the variable x range over every possible natural number. 
 
As a result, a practical interpretation of an ω-inconsistent formal system may be postulated to be, 
for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of the system, a proof exists that employs the principle of 
mathematical induction and states that, for any specific defined n ∈ ℕ, the sentence ϕ(n) must be 
true and a proof also exists that employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum and states that the 
sentence ∀x ϕ(x) cannot be true when the values of the variable x range over all of the natural 
numbers. However, this interpretation is not justified by what is contained in Gödel’s proof 
because the proof-theoretic formal system in Gödel’s proof does not contain a formalization of a 
method of proof that would permit a proof that employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum to 
exist within the formal system. Although this is in contrast to the fact that the proof of Gödel’s 
first incompleteness theorem is itself a proof by contradiction, which is the customary formal 
analogue of a proof that employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum. 
 
Inversely, a meaningful interpretation of an ω-inconsistent formal system may be postulated to be, 
for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of the system, a proof can be composed that states that ϕ(x) 
must be true within the formal system whenever any possible value is substituted for its free 
variable and another proof can be composed that states that the formal sentence ∀x ϕ(x) cannot be 
true within the formal system or equivalently, if the LEM is assumed to be true, that the formal 
sentence ¬∀x ϕ(x) is true within the formal system. Although this interpretation can be justified by 
what is contained in Gödel’s proof the two proofs can easily be perceived to contradict each other, 
at least intuitively, and thus the interpretation becomes dubious to some extent. Hence, the 
interpretation cannot actually be purported to be meaningful. 
 
To illustrate the basic intuitive conceptualization underlying Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency, 
which is devoid of any interpretation, we will employ a set-theoretic definition of ω-inconsistency 
that is essentially equivalent to the definition in Gödel’s proof. First, we define the theory of a 
formal system as, Th = {n ∈ ℕ | Prov(ϕn)}. However, in this definition the provability predicate 
represents any means by which a sentence in the formal system can be determined to be true. As a 
result, the set Th contains every natural number that is the Gödel number of a sentence in the 
language of the formal system that is true. Subsequently, for some formula ϕ(x) in the language of 
a formal system, we define k = [∀x ϕ(x)] and also kn = [ϕ(n)] for every n ∈ ℕ, where k ∈ ℕ and 
each kn ∈ ℕ. An ω-inconsistency is then defined as ∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) ∧ [¬ϕk] ∈ Th, where ¬ϕk 
denotes the sentence that is the negation of the sentence ϕk = ∀x ϕ(x) and thus [¬ϕk] ∈ ℕ is the 
Gödel number of the sentence ¬ϕk = ¬∀x ϕ(x). 
 
As a consequence, although k ∈ Th → ∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) is clearly true due to Gödel’s axiom III.1 
(Appendix B: Gödel’s System), Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency postulates the possibility that 
∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) → k ∈ Th is not necessarily true within a simply consistent formal system. If 
∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) → k = [ϕk] ∈ Th were necessarily true then ∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) ∧ [¬ϕk] ∈ Th 
could never be true within a simply consistent formal system and thus an ω-inconsistent formal 
system could never also be simply consistent. However, an ω-inconsistent formal system is not 
necessarily simply inconsistent according to the definition of ω-inconsistency in Gödel’s proof. 
Therefore, the basic intuitive conceptualization underlying Gödel’s concept of ω-inconsistency is 
that ∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) → k ∈ Th and thus also ∀n ∈ ℕ (kn ∈ Th) ↔ k ∈ Th are not necessarily 
true within a simply consistent formal system. 
 
In conclusion, the following statement by Gödel alludes to the paramount importance of the subtle 
distinction that we have attempted to exhibit ([8] pg. 78), “I believe that the true meaning of the 
opposition between things and concepts or between factual and conceptual truth is not yet 
completely understood in contemporary philosophy, but so much at least is clear: that in both 
cases one is faced with “solid facts”, which are entirely outside the reach of arbitrary decisions.” 
11.5 Simple Intuitive Descriptions of ω-inconsistency and the Proofs of Incompleteness 
We conclude our examination of the concept of ω-inconsistency with another simple, semi-formal 
metamathematical proof that reveals the underlying structure of Gödel’s proof of incompleteness 
as well as the role of ω-inconsistency in his proof. This proof is a simple extension of our previous 
proof (section 11.1: A Simple Intuitive Description of the Proofs of Incompleteness). 
  
An undefined proof relation will be employed in the proof, which like our previous proof may be 
considered to represent any formal definition of validity within the system. And then a provability 
predicate will also be employed that is defined in terms of the proof relation in the usual manner. 
In addition, some ability to reason over every sentence as well as every proof in the language of 
the formal system is necessary and thus an implementation of the metamathematical notion of the 
arithmetization of syntax is also required. Unlike in our previous proof, which only required some 
specific sentence to be defined, a formula with a single free variable replaces that sentence in this 
proof. Therefore, for any formula ϕ(x) in the language of some formal system: 
1: ϕ(x) → Prov(ϕ(x)) 
2: ¬ϕ(x) → Prov(¬ϕ(x)) 
1 and 2 state that for any fixed value c that is a valid substitution for the free variable in ϕ(x) if the 
sentence ϕ(c) or ¬ϕ(c) is true then ϕ(c) or ¬ϕ(c) is provable within the formal system respectively. 
Since ϕ(x) denotes any formula in the language of the system, we then define: 
3: ϕ(x) ≡df ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n)) 
Unlike in the previous proof, which defined a sentence that states that itself is not provable, in this 
proof ϕ(x) is defined as a formula that states that whenever any fixed value is substituted for its 
free variable then that value is not the Gödel number of a proof of the universal closure of itself, 
which is the sentence ∀n ϕ(n). Hence, due to 3 and then if ¬¬ϕ → ϕ is assumed: 
4: ¬ϕ(x) = ¬¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n)) = ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n) 
If it is assumed that a proof of the sentence ∀n ϕ(n) does not exist then a fixed value c = [ϕc] also 
does not exist such that ϕc is a proof of the sentence ∀n ϕ(n). As a result, a proof of the sentence 
ϕ(c) must exist for every fixed value c that is a valid substitution for the free variable in ϕ(x), due 
to 1 and the definition of ϕ(x) in 3, but this contradicts the assumption that a proof of the sentence 
∀n ϕ(n) does not exist if the formal system is assumed to be ω-consistent. Subsequently, if it is 
assumed that a proof of the sentence ∀n ϕ(n) does exist then a fixed value c = [ϕc] also exists such 
that ϕc is a proof of the sentence ∀n ϕ(n). As a result, a proof of the sentence ¬ϕ(c) must exist for 
some fixed value c that is a valid substitution for the free variable in ϕ(x), due to 2 and the equality 
in 4, but this contradicts the assumption that a proof of the sentence ∀n ϕ(n) exists if the formal 
system is assumed to be simply consistent. The contradictions may be more clearly expressed by 
substituting the definition of ϕ(x) in 3 for ϕ(x) in the antecedent of 1 and 2 using the equality in 4. 
5: ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n)) → Prov(ϕ(x)) 
6: ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n) → Prov(¬ϕ(x)) 
And the contradictions may then be clearly seen by adding the applicable quantifiers: 
7: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n)) → ∀x Prov(ϕ(x)) 
8: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕ(n)) → ∃x Prov(¬ϕ(x)) 
As a result, the source of the contradictions in Gödel’s proof is clearly illustrated and thus the role 
of ω-inconsistency within his proof becomes evident as well. 
 
Since this proof reflects the underlying structure of a proof of incompleteness that includes the 
concept of ω-inconsistency then our previous proof reflects the underlying structure of a proof of 
incompleteness that does not include the concept of ω-inconsistency. Hence, this proof reveals the 
underlying structure of Gödel’s proof of incompleteness whereas our previous proof reveals the 
underlying structure of all of the other proofs of incompleteness that do not require the assumption 
that the formal system is ω-consistent, which includes Rosser’s proof of incompleteness as well as 
Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson’s proof of incompleteness. 
 
Therefore, we will employ our previous proof to reveal the underlying structure of Rosser’s proof 
of incompleteness. The sentence ϕ in the previous proof will be defined to be the Gödel sentence 
ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n) in Gödel’s proof (section 4: Gödel’s Proof), in symbols: ϕ ≡df ∀n ϕr(n), and then 
∀n ϕr(n) is substituted for ϕ in 1 and 2 in our previous proof: 
1: ∀n ϕr(n) → Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) 
2: ¬∀n ϕr(n) → Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) 
Due to the definition of the formula ϕr, then the definition of the relation Q, and then the equality 
ϕp(p) = ∀n ϕr(n) along with a change of the bound variable: 
3: ∀n ϕr(n) = ∀n ϕq(n, p) = ∀n ¬(ϕn ProofOf ϕp(p)) = ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) 
Hence, due to 3 and then Gödel’s relation 32.d (Appendix B: Gödel’s System): 
4: ¬∀n ϕr(n) = ¬∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) = ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) 
If ∀n ϕr(n) is assumed to be true then Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) must also be true, due to 1. However, since 
Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) = ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) = ¬∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)), due to the definition of 
the provability predicate and then Gödel’s relation 32.d, if the system is assumed to be simply 
consistent then this contradicts the definition of the sentence ∀n ϕr(n), due to the equality in 3. 
Subsequently, if ¬∀n ϕr(n) is assumed to be true then Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) must also be true, due to 2. 
However, since Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) = ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ¬∀n ϕr(n)), due to the definition of the 
provability predicate, if the formal system is assumed to be simply consistent then this contradicts 
the definition of the sentence ¬∀n ϕr(n), due to the equality in 4. The contradictions may be more 
clearly expressed by substituting the definition of ∀n ϕr(n) for the sentence ∀n ϕr(n) in the 
antecedent of 1 and 2 using the equalities in 3 and 4. 
5: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) 
6: ∃x (ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) 
And the contradictions may then be clearly seen by employing the definition of the provability 
predicate as well as Gödel’s relation 32.d: 
7: ∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) → ¬∀x ¬(ϕx ProofOf ∀n ϕr(n)) 
8: Prov(∀n ϕr(n)) → Prov(¬∀n ϕr(n)) 
As a result, it becomes evident that the basis of the contradictions in Rosser’s proof is the logical 
paradox that is implicit within the self-referential and self-contradictory formal sentence that states 
of itself that it is not provable. 
 
Our previous proof can also be employed in precisely the same manner to reveal the underlying 
structure of Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson’s proof of incompleteness. First, the sentence ϕ in 
our previous proof is defined to be the Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson sentence ϕm(m), in 
symbols: ϕ ≡df ϕm(m). Subsequently, 3 becomes ϕm(m) = ∀n (n = [ϕm(m)] → ¬Prov(ϕn)) and then 
4 becomes ¬ϕm(m) = ¬∀n (n = [ϕm(m)] → ¬Prov(ϕn)) = ∃n (n = [ϕm(m)] ∧ Prov(ϕn)), assuming 
¬∀x ϕ(x) → ∃x ¬ϕ(x) and (ϕ → ¬Ψ) → ¬(ϕ ∧ Ψ) and thus also ¬¬ϕ → ϕ are true. Since n = [ϕn] 
then ϕn denotes the sentence ϕm(m), which is the sentence that results from substituting the value 
m = [ϕm(x)] for the free variable in the formula ϕm(x). 
11.6 Some Additional Theorems About Incompleteness 
We will now prove the following two theorems, which are immediately implied by the proof of 
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. The customary definition of the Law of the Excluded 
Middle (LEM) as well as its intuitive interpretation will be assumed, which states that for any 
sentence in the language of a formal system either the sentence or its negation must be true, in 
symbols: ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. In addition, it will also be assumed that what is true within a formal system is 
synonymous with what can be proven within the formal system, which is essentially the intuitive 
corollary to proposition 1 (section 2.5: The Fundamental Concepts of Proof and Truth). 
Theorem 2: the LEM does not necessarily hold in a formal system that is incomplete. 
Proof: immediate due to the definition of an incomplete formal system in Gödel’s proof, which 
states that a formal system is incomplete if, for any sentence in the language of the system, a proof 
does not exist within the system for neither the sentence nor for its negation ([1.a] pg. 147). ■ 
 
Thus, any intuitive or philosophical argument based on a semantic evaluation of truth that attempts 
to assert the validity or truth of the LEM is rejected as irrelevant because, in practice, the LEM 
clearly does not hold in a formal system that is incomplete. And then furthermore: 
Theorem 3: a proof that employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum is not necessarily a 
valid method of proof in a formal system within which the LEM does not hold. 
Proof: a proof that employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum will often assert that if either 
the sentence ϕ or the sentence ¬ϕ is proven to be absurd and thus not true then the other sentence 
must necessarily be true. Therefore, if a proof does not exist within a formal system for neither ϕ 
or ¬ϕ, which must be the case for some sentences ϕ and ¬ϕ in the language of a system within 
which the LEM does not hold, then a proof that either ϕ or ¬ϕ is absurd and thus not true cannot 
subsequently assert that the other sentence must necessarily be true because both sentences may 
not be true within the formal system. ■ 
Corollary 1: ¬¬ϕ → ϕ does not hold in a formal system within which the LEM does not hold. 
Proof: immediate due to the proof of theorem 3, assuming ¬¬ϕ ≡df ¬ϕ is False. The corollary may 
also be inferred from Kleene’s remark that ¬¬ϕ → ϕ and ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ are interchangeable as axioms in 
the classical system ([4] pg. 120). ■ 
 
It should be emphasized that theorem 2 does not state that the LEM is false, but rather that it is not 
necessarily true. Theorem 3 then makes an equivalent statement about the validity of a proof that 
employs the principle of reductio ad absurdum. Hence, the preceding theorems may be interpreted 
as a justification of the intuitionistic assertion that the LEM is not necessarily valid in every case. 
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APPENDIX A: GÖDEL NUMBERS AND THE ARITHMETIZATION OF SYNTAX 
We will formally define a process of constructing Gödel numbers that is equivalent to the process 
outlined informally in section 2.4: Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax. In the 
following definitions ℕ denotes the set of natural numbers, L denotes the language of some formal 
system, which consists of every finite sequence of symbols constructed from an alphabet of n ≥ 1 
unique defined symbols, and L* denotes the set of every finite ordered subset of L. In addition, a 
consecutive natural number is assigned to each of the symbols in the alphabet of L starting with 1. 
A Method of Constructing Gödel Numbers: the bijective functions fn: L → ℕ and gn: L* → ℕ 
are defined as:  
 1.  fn(s) = ∑ci∈s ni–1(ci) 
 2.  gn(S) = ∏si∈S pi
fn(si) 
As is customary, for any n ≥ 1 we define n0 = 1 and then we also define the result of an empty 
summation as well as an empty multiplication to be 0. 
 
In definition 1, s ∈ L denotes some string, which is some ordered sequence of characters and a 
character is a symbol in the alphabet of L that is not necessarily unique in s. Hence, s = c1, …, cm, 
where m ≥ 0 is the number of characters in s, and thus ci ∈ s denotes the ith character in s. Since 
every symbol in the alphabet of L is assigned a unique natural number for the purpose of 
constructing the Gödel numbers and since every ci ∈ s represents some symbol then during the 
calculation of the function fn each ci ∈ s is calculated using the natural number that was assigned 
to the symbol that it represents. Finally, ∑ci∈s indicates the sum ranging over every ci ∈ s. 
 
In definition 2, S ∈ L* denotes some finite ordered subset of L, which is some ordered sequence of 
0 or more s ∈ L. Hence, S = s1, …, sm, where m ≥ 0 is the number of strings in S and each string is 
not necessarily unique in S, and thus si ∈ S denotes the ith string in S. Subsequently, pi denotes the 
ith prime number or p1 = 2, p2 = 3, p3 = 5, … and the fn(si), which is from definition 1, is the Gödel 
number of si ∈ S. Finally, ∏si∈S indicates the product ranging over every si ∈ S. 
 
Therefore, the bijective function fn is a one-to-one correspondence between every possible s ∈ L 
and every natural number. However, fn is not a one-to-one correspondence between every formula 
in the language of some formal system and every natural number because, although every formula 
is some s ∈ L, not every s ∈ L is a legitimate or well-formed formula. As a consequence, since the 
set of every well-formed formula in the language of some formal system is a proper subset of L 
then the function fn merely defines an injective or one-to-one function between every well-formed 
formula and the natural numbers. 
 
To make this more precise we will need to define a predicate that determines whether an arbitrary 
sequence of symbols in the language of some formal system is a well-formed formula. Since every 
formal system must have explicitly defined rules for mechanically deciding whether an arbitrary 
sequence of symbols in the language of the system is a well-formed formula, we can intuitively 
define the predicate WFFL that applies these rules for the language L. Thus, for any arbitrary 
sequence of symbols s ∈ L, WFFL(s) is true if and only if s ∈ L is a well-formed formula. We will 
denote the set of every well-formed formula in the language L of some formal system by Lϕ and, 
by employing the predicate WFFL , we then define Lϕ as, s ∈ Lϕ ↔ s ∈ L ∧ WFFL(s). As a result, 
if the domain of the bijective function fn is restricted to every s ∈ Lϕ or fn: Lϕ → ℕ then fn is an 
injective function, not a bijective function. 
 
Subsequently, using the function fn from definition 1 of A Method of Constructing Gödel Numbers 
along with the least search operator that was defined in section 3: Notation and Terminology and 
the predicate WFFL that was just defined we will construct a bijective function between Lϕ and the 
natural numbers. First, we need to define a complete enumeration of every s ∈ Lϕ. 
An Enumeration of Every Well-Formed Formula: the enumeration En: ℕ → ℕ is a bijective 
function and En(m) = [ϕ], where [ϕ] = fn(s) for some s ∈ Lϕ, and thus value of the function En(m) 
is the Gödel number of the mth well-formed formula in the language L of some formal system. 
The function En(m) is defined as: 
 En(0) = µk ∈ ℕ (∃s ∈ L [fn(s) = k ∧ WFFL(s)]) 
 En(m + 1) = µk ∈ ℕ (k > En(m) ∧ [∃s ∈ L (fn(s) = k ∧ WFFL(s))]) 
We will note that if the inverse of the bijective function fn, denoted by fn–1, is employed in the 
definition then the existential quantifier becomes unnecessary thus resulting in the more concise 
definition: En(0) = µk ∈ ℕ (WFFL(fn–1(k))) and En(m + 1) = µk ∈ ℕ (k > En(m) ∧ WFFL(fn–1(k))).  
A Bijection Between Every Well-Formed Formula and the Natural Numbers: the bijective 
function hn: Lϕ → ℕ as well as its inverse hn–1: ℕ → Lϕ are defined as: 
 hn(s) = ∃m ∈ ℕ (En(m) = fn(s)) 
 hn–1(m) = ∃s ∈ Lϕ (fn(s) = En(m)) 
As a consequence, the definition of the bijective function gn from definition 2 of A Method of 
Constructing Gödel Numbers can then easily be modified to be gn: Lϕ* → ℕ, where Lϕ* denotes the 
set of every finite ordered subset of Lϕ, simply by replacing the fn(si) in the definition of gn with 
hn(si). The resulting function is a bijective function between Lϕ* and ℕ. Since Lϕ* is the set of every 
finite ordered sequence of well-formed formulas in the language L of some formal system then Lϕ* 
contains every deductive proof in the formal system. 
 
In addition, every function that was just defined is primitive recursive because every unbounded 
quantifier or least search operator within the definitions of the functions can be explicitly bounded. 
This is because it may be easily seen that for every sx ∈ Lϕ some sy ∈ Lϕ can be constructed such 
that WFFL(sy) and fn(sx) < fn(sy) and thus also hn(sx) < hn(sy). As a result, the Gödel number of this 
sy ∈ Lϕ or fn(sy) may then be employed as an explicit upper bound within the definitions. 
 
APPENDIX B: GÖDEL’S SYSTEM 
We will provide the entire formal system that Gödel constructed in his proof with updated notation 
along with brief explanations of the components of his system. The notation was updated because 
much of the notation that Gödel employed in his proof is no longer in use. In all cases the updated 
notion is directly equivalent to the notation that Gödel employed. 
 
First, we define the primitive symbols in the language of Gödel’s formal system along with the 
unique natural numbers that were assigned to those symbols for the purpose of constructing the 
Gödel numbers of the formulas in his system. The primitive symbols are given in quotation marks.  
Primitive Symbols: “0” = 1,  “f” = 3,  “¬” = 5,  “∨” = 7,  “∏” = 9,  “(“ = 11,  “)” = 13 and then 
further, to the variables of type n, the numbers of the form pn where p denotes a prime number 
greater than 13. 
 “0” represents the numeric quantity zero, “f” the successor operation, “¬” and  “∨” are the logical 
operations of negation and disjunction respectively, “∏” is the universal quantifier, and then “(“ 
and “)” are the left and right parenthesis respectively. The methodology for representing variables 
of a specific type n is due to the simple theory of types and thus is included for technical accuracy 
only as mentioned in section 2.4: Gödel Numbers and the Arithmetization of Syntax. 
 
We now define the axioms of Gödel’s system. In the first group of axioms, the variables n and m 
are numeric variables and the variable A is a set variable. (Technically, due to the simple theory of 
types, the variables n and m are variables of type k and the variable A is a variable of type k + 1.) 
Axioms I (Natural Number Axioms): 
 1:  f(n) ≠ 0 
 2:  f(n) = f(m) → n = m 
 3:  (0 ∈ A ∧ ∀n [n ∈ A → f(n) ∈ A]) → ∀n (n ∈ A) 
The preceding axioms are based on the Peano Axioms and formally define the natural numbers 
within Gödel’s system. Axiom I.1 states that zero is not the successor of any natural number. 
Axiom I.2 states that every natural number has a unique successor. And axiom I.3 is a set-theoretic 
formalization of the principle of mathematical induction. In the next group of axioms the variables 
P, Q and R are propositional variables. 
Axioms II (Axioms of Propositional Logic): 
 1: P ∨ P → P 
 2: P → P ∨ Q 
 3: P ∨ Q → Q ∨ P 
 4: (P → Q) → (R ∨ P → R ∨ Q) 
All of the preceding axioms are simply propositional tautologies. In the next group of axioms x is 
a variable, c any term free for x (and of the same type as x), ϕ(x) is a formula and Ψ is a formula in 
which the variable x does not occur free. 
Axioms III (Axioms of Predicate Logic): 
 1: ∀x ϕ(x) → ϕ(c) 
 2: ∀x (Ψ ∨ ϕ(x)) → Ψ ∨ ∀x ϕ(x) 
Intuitively, axiom III.1 states that if the sentence ∀x ϕ(x) is true and c denotes any possible value 
of the variable x then it may be inferred that ϕ(c) is true. And Axiom III.2 simply states that if x is 
not a free variable in the formula Ψ and if, for every possible value of the variable x, either Ψ or 
ϕ(x) is true then it may be inferred that either Ψ is true or else ϕ(x) is true for every possible value 
of the variable x. In the next two axioms A and B are set variables and the variable x is a variable 
whose values range over every possible member of the sets A and B. (Technically, again due to the 
simple theory of types, the variable x is a variable of type k and the variables A and B are variables 
of type k + 1.) 
Axiom IV (Set-Theoretic Axiom of Comprehension): 
 1: ∃A (∀x [x ∈ A ↔ ϕ(x)]) 
This axiom is one of the axioms of Set Theory. The axiom states that every set is defined by some 
formula (or definite property) ϕ(x). It is of interest to note that this specific formalization of the 
axiom has been proven to be simply inconsistent due to the discovery of Russell’s paradox. 
However, this axiom may be replaced by the modern version of the axiom, which has not been 
proven to be simply inconsistent, with essentially no change to Gödel’s proof. The modern version 
of the axiom is: ∃A (∀x [x ∈ A ↔ x ∈ B ∧ ϕ(x)]), where B is not free in ϕ(x). This axiom is called 
the axiom of subsets. 
Axiom V (Set-Theoretic Axiom of Extensionality): 
 1: ∀x (x ∈ A ↔ x ∈ B) → A = B 
This axiom is also one of the axioms of Set Theory. The axiom simply states that any two sets that 
contain exactly the same members are the same set and thus, intuitively, the axiom asserts that a 
set is defined by its members. 
 
Finally, we will define the relations that Gödel employed in his proof. With the exception of the 
updated and more descriptive notation, the relations along with their descriptions are essentially 
identical to how Gödel defined them in his proof. 
 
1: x|y ≡df ∃z ≤ x (x = y × z) 
x is divisible by y. 
2: IsPrime(x) ≡df x > 1 ∧ ¬∃z ≤ x (z ≠ 1 ∧ z ≠ x ∧ x|z) 
x is a prime number. 
3: 0 PrimeOf x ≡df 0 
(n+1) PrimeOf x ≡df µy < x (IsPrime(y) ∧ x|y ∧ y > n PrimeOf x) 
 n PrimeOf x is the nth prime number (in order of increasing magnitude) contained in x. 
4: 0! ≡df 1 
(n+1)! ≡df (n + 1) × n! 
n! is the factorial of n. 
5: Prime(0) ≡df 0 
Prime(n+1) ≡df µy ≤ Prime(n)! + 1 (IsPrime(y) ∧ y > Prime(n)) 
 Prime(n) is the nth prime number (in order of increasing magnitude). 
6: n TermOf x ≡df µy ≤ x (x|(n PrimeOf x)y ∧ ¬[x|(n PrimeOf x)y+1]) 
n TermOf x is the nth term of the number sequence assigned to the number x (for n > 0 
and n not greater than the length of this sequence). 
7: Len(x) ≡df µy ≤ x (y PrimeOf x > 0 ∧ y + 1 PrimeOf x = 0) 
Len(x) is the length of the number sequence assigned to x. 
8: x * y ≡df µz ≤ Prime(Len(x) + Len(y))x+y (∀n ≤ Len(x) [n TermOf z = n TermOf x] ∧ 
∀n ≤ Len(y) [n > 0 → (n + Len(x)) TermOf z = n TermOf y]) 
 x * y corresponds to the operation of “concatenating” two finite number sequences. 
9: Sym(x) ≡df 2x 
Sym(x) corresponds to the number sequence consisting of x alone (for x > 0). 
10: E(x) ≡df Sym(11) * x * Sym(13) 
E(x) corresponds to the operation of “enclosing within parentheses” (11 and 13 are 
assigned to the primitive signs “(“ and “)”, respectively). 
11: n Var x ≡df n ≠ 0 ∧ ∃z ≤ x (z > 13 ∧ IsPrime(z) ∧ x = zn) 
x is a VARIABLE of TYPE n. 
12: IsVar(x) ≡df ∃n ≤ x (n Var x) 
x is a VARIABLE. 
13: Neg(x) ≡df Sym(5) * E(x) 
Neg(x) is the NEGATION of x. 
14: x Dis y ≡df E(x) * Sym(7) * E(y) 
x Dis y is the DISJUNCTION of x and y. 
15: x Gen y ≡df Sym(x) * Sym(9) * E(y) 
x Gen y is the GENERALIZATION of y with respect to the VARIABLE x (provided x is 
a VARIABLE). Note: Gödel writes x ∏ (y) where we would write ∀x ϕy(x). 
16: 0 S x ≡df x 
(n+1) S x ≡df Sym(3) * (n S x) 
 n S x corresponds to the operation of “putting the sign ‘ f ’ n times in front of x”. 
17: Num(n) ≡df n S Sym(1) 
Num(n) is the NUMERAL denoting the number n. 
18: Type1(x) ≡df ∃m ≤ x ∃n ≤ x ([m = 1 ∨ 1 Var m] ∧ x = n S Sym(m)) 
x is a SIGN OF TYPE 1. 
19: Typen(x) ≡df (n = 1 ∧ Type1΄(x)) ∨ (n > 1 ∧ ∃v ≤ x [n Var v ∧ x = Sym(v)]) 
x is a SIGN OF TYPE n. 
20: EF(x) ≡df ∃y ≤ x ∃z ≤ x ∃n ≤ x (Typen(y) ∧ Typen+1(z) ∧ x = z * E(y)) 
x is an ELEMENTARY FORMULA. 
21: Op(x, y, z) ≡df x = Neg(y) ∨ x = y Dis z ∨ ∃v ≤ x (IsVar(v) ∧ x = v Gen y) 
22: FR(x) ≡df Len(x) > 0 ∧ ∀n ≤ Len(x) (n > 0 → [EF(n TermOf x) ∨ ∃p < n ∃q < n (p > 0 ∧ 
q > 0 ∧ Op(n TermOf x, p TermOf x, q TermOf x)]) 
x is a SEQUENCE OF FORMULAS, each term of which either is an ELEMENTARY 
FORMULA or results from the preceding FORMULAS through the operations of 
NEGATION, DISJUNCTION, or GENERALIZATION. 
23: IsFormula(x) ≡df ∃n ≤ Prime([Len(x)]2)x × (Len(x))2 (FR(n) ∧ x = Len(n) TermOf n) 
x is a FORMULA (that is, the last term of a FORMULA SEQUENCE n). 
24: v Bound n, x ≡df IsVar(v) ∧ IsFormula(x) ∧ ∃a ≤ x ∃b ≤ x ∃c ≤ x (x = a * (v Gen b) * c ∧ 
IsFormula(b) ∧ [Len(a) + 1] ≤ n ≤ [Len(a) + Len(v Gen b)]) 
 the VARIABLE v is BOUND in x at the nth place. 
25: v Free n, x ≡df IsVar(v) ∧ IsFormula(x) ∧ v = n TermOf x ∧ n ≤ Len(x) ∧ ¬(v Bound n, x) 
the VARIABLE v is FREE in x at the nth place. 
26: v Free x ≡df ∃n ≤ Len(x) (v Free n, x) 
v occurs as a FREE VARIABLE in x. 
27: Sb x( ny ) ≡df µz ≤ Prime(Len(x) + Len(y))x+y (∃u ≤ x ∃v ≤ x 
[x = u * Sym(n TermOf x) * v ∧ z = u * y * v ∧ n = Len(u) + 1]) 
Sb x( ny ) results from x when we substitute y for the nth term of x (provided that 
0 < n ≤ Len(x)). 
28: 0 St v, x ≡df µn ≤ Len(x) (v Free n, x ∧ ¬∃p ≤ Len(x) [p > n ∧ v Free p, x]) 
(k+1) St v, x ≡df µn < k St v, x (v Free n, x ∧ ¬∃p < k St v, x [p > n ∧ v Free p, x]) 
k St v, x is the (k+1)th place in x (counted from the right end of the FORMULA x) at 
which v is FREE in x (and 0 in case there is not such a place). 
29: NumFree(v, x) ≡df µn ≤ Len(x) (n St v, x = 0) 
NumFree(v, x) is the number of places at which v is FREE in x. 
30: Sub0(x vy ) ≡df x 
Subk+1(x vy ) ≡df Sb Subk(x vy )( k Styv, x ) 
31: Sub(x vy ) ≡df SubNumFree(v, x)(x vy ) 
Sub(x vy ) is the notion SUBST a( vb ) defined above. Note: SUBST a( vb ) was defined by 
Gödel as the process of creating a new formula by substituting b for every occurrence of 
the variable v in the formula a. 
32: a.  x Implies y ≡df Neg(x) Dis y 
b.  x Con y ≡df Neg(Neg(x) Dis Neg(y)) 
c.  x Equal y ≡df (x Implies y) Con (y Implies x) 
d.  v Ex y ≡df Neg(v Gen Neg(y)) 
33: n Th x ≡df µy ≤ x(xn) (∀k ≤ Len(x) [(k TermOf x ≤ 13 ∧ k TermOf y = k TermOf x) ∨ 
(k TermOf x > 13 ∧ k TermOf y = k TermOf x × [1 PrimeOf (k TermOf x)n])]) 
 n Th x is the nTH TYPE ELEVATION of x (in case x and n Th x are FORMULAS). 
Three specific numbers, which we denote by z1, z2, and z3, correspond to the Axioms I, 
1 – 3, and we define 
34: Z-Ax(x) ≡df x = z1 ∨ x = z2 ∨ x = z3 
35: A1-Ax(x) ≡df ∃y ≤ x (IsFormula(y) ∧ x = [y Dis y] Implies y) 
x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom Schema II, 1 by substitution. Analogously, 
A2-Ax, A3-Ax, and A4-Ax are defined from Axioms [rather, Axiom Schemata] II, 2 – 4. 
36: A-A(x) ≡df A1-Ax(x) ∨ A2-Ax(x) ∨ A3-Ax(x) ∨ A4-Ax(x) 
37: Q(z, y, v) ≡df ¬(∃n ≤ y ∃m ≤ Len(z) ∃w ≤ z [w = m TermOf z ∧ w Bound n, y ∧ v Free n, y]) 
 z does not contain any VARIABLE BOUND in y at a place at which v is FREE. 
38: L1-Ax(x) ≡df ∃v ≤ x ∃y ≤ x ∃z ≤ x ∃n ≤ x (n Var v ∧ Typen(z) ∧ IsFormula(y) ∧ Q(z, y, v) ∧ 
x = [v Gen y] Implies [Sub(y vz )]) 
x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom Schema III, 1 by substitution. 
39: L2-Ax(x) ≡df ∃v ≤ x ∃q ≤ x ∃p ≤ x (IsVar(v) ∧ IsFormula(p) ∧ v Free p ∧ IsFormula(q) ∧ 
x = [v Gen (p Dis q)] Implies [p Dis (v Gen q)]) 
 x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom Schema III, 2 by substitution. 
40: R-Ax(x) ≡df ∃u ≤ x ∃v ≤ x ∃y ≤ x ∃n ≤ x (n Var v ∧ (n + 1) Var u ∧ ¬[u Free y] ∧ 
IsFormula(y) ∧ x = u Ex [v Gen ([Sym(u) * E(Sym(v))] Equal y)]) 
 x is a FORMULA resulting from Axiom Schema IV, 1 by substitution. 
A specific number z4 corresponds to Axiom V, 1, and we define 
41: M-Ax(x) ≡df ∃n ≤ x (n Th z4) 
42: Ax(x) ≡df Z-Ax(x) ∨ A-A(x) ∨ L1-Ax(x) ∨ L2-Ax(x) ∨ R-Ax(x) ∨ M-Ax(x) 
x is an AXIOM. 
43: ImmCon(x, y, z) ≡df y = z Implies x ∨ ∃v ≤ x (IsVar(v) ∧ x = v Gen y) 
x is an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of y and z. 
44: ProofArray(x) ≡df Len(x) > 0 ∧ ∀n ≤ Len(x) (n > 0 → [Ax(n TermOf x) ∨ 
∃p < n ∃q < n (p > 0 ∧ q > 0 ∧ ImmCon(n TermOf x, p TermOf x, q TermOf x))]) 
x is a PROOF ARRAY (a finite sequence of FORMULAS, each of which is either an 
AXIOM or an IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE of two of the preceding FORMULAS). 
45: x ProofOf y ≡df ProofArray(x) ∧ Len(x) TermOf x = y 
x is a PROOF of the FORMULA y. 
46: Prov(x) ≡df ∃y (y ProofOf x) 
x is a PROVABLE FORMULA. (Prov(x) is the only one of the notions 1 – 46 of which 
we cannot assert that it is [primitive] recursive.) 
 
 Copyright 2015 Jason Steinmetz, all rights reserved. 
